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Abstract
Disease remains the primary threat to human life and prosperity in developing countries.
Over the last two decades, development aid for health has increased substantially, yet the
affects of disease remain severe in many countries. Unlike other types of development aid,
health aid is often viewed as technical and apolitical. I argue that, development aid for
health is subject to political influences and distributional incentives similar to other forms
of foreign aid. Although allocations undoubtedly reflect some aspects of recipient need, I
contend that the benefits received by donors’ constituencies as a result of health aid will
condition these allocations. I examine the distribution of aid across diseases using disease
burden as an objective measure of need. Using variation across disease characteristics —
including geographic spread, cost of prevention and treatment, and both donor and recipient
burden of disease — I illuminate the effects of donors’ interests upon disease specific health
aid allocations. I then extend the analysis to the distribution of health aid across disease
control activities. Donors’ interests play a significant role in the distribution of aid across
diseases, yet have little effect on the selection of disease control activities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Infectious disease has historically accounted for the greatest proportion of human morbidity
and mortality — surpassing war as the foremost threat to human life (McNeill 1976). Over
the past two centuries, the threat of disease has prompted diverse efforts at international
cooperation. The eradication of smallpox and the near eradication of polio demonstrated the
potential public benefits of global cooperation. More recently, the spread of HIV/AIDS and
the resurgence of tuberculosis have renewed international health concerns, drawing attention
and funding from an array of international actors hecht06. Yet, even with record levels of
international funds being spent to combat disease, the benefits of these efforts have been
uneven across developing states and across diseases. Many developing states continue to
struggle with diseases that are geographically limited or easily prevented and treated in
industrialized states. Millions of people in developing states die each year from measles,
acute respiratory infections, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases. In an international system
devoting ever increasing attention and resources to health, what explains the inconsistent
improvement of health in developing states? I contend that part of the answer to this
question lies in how development assistance for health is distributed. Indeed, of the few
analyses of development aid for health (DAH), most indicate that, although record levels of
aid are being provided, the distribution of aid to control specific diseases does not match
need (MacKellar 2005, Shiffman 2006).
The literature on aid distribution suggests that most foreign aid allocations are subject
to a constellation of political forces. In contrast, international health, and subsequently
DAH, are generally viewed as technical rather than political issues. As a result, the study
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of aid for health has been largely overlooked by policy-makers and scholars. I argue that,
like other forms of foreign aid, DAH is subject to political influences. Although allocations
undoubtedly reflect some aspects of recipient need, donors’ interests regarding specific dis-
eases, programs, and recipients are expected to alter the distribution of DAH. Given that the
political forces driving aid decisions are based upon the political and economic priorities of
developed countries, there are many ways in which DAH allocations will fail to reflect need
in developing countries. Where funding does not correspond with need the consequences
include increased disease, disability and death. Using theories of public goods, international
cooperation and foreign aid, I develop a theory of DAH allocations based upon donors’ in-
terests. I use variations across disease characteristics such as geographic spread and disease
burden, in order to examine donors priorities for disease specific aid. I find strong sup-
port for the theory that donors provide more aid for diseases with wider geographic spread
and greater domestic disease burden, whereas I find little evidence that recipient burden of
disease affects disease specific aid allocations.
1.1 International Health and Cooperation
Efforts to control the spread of disease are as old as states themselves and include some of the
earliest formal efforts at international cooperation outside of military alliances. Outbreaks
of cholera, bubonic plague, yellow fever and other infectious diseases have long illustrated
the permeability of state boundaries to disease. This permeability increased dramatically in
the mid-nineteenth century. Improvements to travel and commerce, such as the invention of
steel-hulled ships and railways spurred increased international migration and trade between
Europe and Asia. These increases enabled the spread many diseases, especially cholera
(Sigfried 1965, Foreman-Peck 1983, Zacher 2007, Zacher & Keefe 2008). European cholera
epidemics in 1832 and 1853 originated in India and Russia respectively, while an outbreak of
plague in 1899 originated in China (Sigfried 1965, Goodman 1971, Zacher 2007). The spread
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of disease was not limited to Europe. Trade, colonial travel and religious pilgrimages brought
diseases to other states along major trade routes – especially Mediterranean states such as
Egypt. With poorer health systems, diseases such as cholera were far more devastating in
these places. (Sigfried 1965).
Before 1850, efforts to control the spread of disease were primarily unilateral efforts by
individual states involving the quarantine of ships and embargoes of goods from endemic
areas. Such measures resulted in increased financial costs to shipping and barriers to trade.
To curtail the cost of disease control measures, states orchestrated a series of conferences on
international health concerns attended by diplomatic and health experts from more than a
dozen governments. Beginning in 1851, these conferences attempted to establish standards
for disease control without undue hinderance to commerce. These first attempts at multi-
lateral cooperation proved contentious, both politically and medically. After nearly half a
century of such conferences, the first formal health agreement – the International Sanitary
Convention (ISC)– was ratified in 1892 (Fidler 2005). The key provisions for the ISC in-
cluded the obligation of ship owners to maintain ship sanitation standards and health logs,
the obligation of port authorities to provide lazarettos for sick passengers without hindering
the landing of passengers with a clean bill of health, and the right of port authorities to
inspect ships and health logs and enforce the quarantine of passengers from infected ves-
sels for a specified number of days (Fidler 2005, Zacher & Keefe 2008). The ISC was later
replaced by the International Health Regulations (IHR), in 1903. The IHR — an interna-
tional convention directed specifically at the containment of cholera and bubonic plague —
attempted to regulate states’ health practices in order to reduce their burden on trade. In
1912 and 1926, the IHR was revisited and expanded to include typhus, yellow fever and
smallpox (Goodman 1971, Zacher 2007).
Despite the benefits of these measures, implementation was inconsistent and monitoring
and sanctioning mechanisms were weak. Many developing states were reluctant to report
outbreaks, fearing embargoes and economic penalties. In contrast, improved sanitation
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systems as well as new medicines and vaccines enabled developed states to control local
outbreaks with relative ease. Thus, although the IHR remained in effect, its provisions
were largely disregarded — the one exception being the regulation of ports. (Sigfried 1965,
Goodman 1971, Fidler 2005, Zacher 2007).
Expansion of cooperation on health began again in 1922, with the establishment of the
League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO). Although previous cooperation focused
upon coordination of states’ domestic policies, the LNHO involved efforts by industrialized
countries to provide technical assistance and medical advice to developing countries (Berridge
& Herring 2009). These activities served as the basis for future efforts. By the end of
World War II, efforts at international health cooperation had shifted from compliance and
containment to information dissemination and technical assistance. Specifically, the LNHO’s
mandate focused upon the collection of statistical data and the development of scientific
knowledge and international health standards (Berridge & Herring 2009). As an international
organ intended to improve cooperation among health ministries, the LNHO suffered from
the same issues of legitimacy that the rest of the League of Nations suffered from — failure
of the United States to participate — and dissolved with the advent of World War II.
In 1946, the World Health Organization was created to provide financial assistance for
international health projects with the hope of improving health coordination and marked
the beginning a current system of health governance (Zacher 2007). This new effort at
cooperation relatively proved effective. Indeed, the WHO’s campaign to eradicate smallpox
in the 1960’s and 70’s is often regarded as the model for effective global cooperation on
health (Goodman 1971, Zacher 2007). In 1959, ten years after mass vaccination programs
had virtually eliminated the disease from the United States and Russia, smallpox remained
endemic in 59 countries with an estimated 50 million new cases each year. The WHO
campaign relied upon national contributions from industrialized countries for transportation,
equipment and medical supplies, including donations of freeze-dried vaccines. Despite a slow
start and inconsistent funding, improved technical and material support from individual
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donors - the US in particular - produced dramatic results. The last case of smallpox was
recorded in October of 1977 and the World Health Assembly declared smallpox eradicated
in May of 1980 (Fenner 1988, Levine & Kinder 2007).
On the heels of this success, a consensus emerged within the health community which
viewed poor health anywhere as a threat to good health everywhere. To this end, the Alma
Alta Declaration, signed in 1978, declared ”...the attainment of health by people in any
one country directly concerns and benefits every other country.” Such sentiments were soon
bolstered by the threat and spread of new and reemergent diseases. The identification of
diseases like Ebola — which can have a nearly 90 percent mortality rate — and the rapid
spread HIV/AIDS in the 1980’s and 90’s have provided ample evidence that dangers to
health still loom and can spread undetected across borders. Likewise, the reemergence of
diseases such as tuberculosis – previously prevented and controlled in industrialized states
– demonstrated states’ continued vulnerability. In addition, poor health has recently been
connected to other negative outcomes. Poor worker health has been tied to poor economic
performance leading to depressed economic growth (McNeill 1976, Institute of Medicine
1997, United Nations Security Council 2000, Jamison, Sachs & Wang 2001, World Health
Organization 2002, Global Burden of Disease Project 2003, Heymann 2003, World Bank
2004). Likewise, some argue that poor health contributes to frustration within the population
and a weakening of the state resulting in instability and potential collapse (Smith-Price 2002,
HIV and National Security: Where are the Links? 2005) The connection of poor health to
these negative outcomes has increased demand for international health cooperation and
coordination. Much of this increased attention has been directed at health problems with
roots in developing states.
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 1990 reflected an in-
creased international commitment to health in developing states. Of the eight goals, three
specifically deal with health in developing countries. Goals 4 and 5 focus upon the reduc-
tion of childhood mortality and improvement of maternal health, while Goal 6 establishes
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combatting HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases as key to improved development (Hecht
& Shah 2006, Wagstaff & Fang 2006, Zacher 2007).
Health cooperation at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries
reflects this expanding mission. Initiatives for cooperation now include improving infras-
tructure, access to basic health care, administrative and policy management, and medical
research and development among others. Likewise, the number of actors has grown expo-
nentially. The role of individual states is now accompanied and sometimes overshadowed
by intergovernmental agencies. For example, the WHO’s role in surveillance has expanded
dramatically. Although disease reports had previously come directly from state govern-
ments, changes in information technology has enabled health professionals and the media
to report disease outbreaks. Unable to hide outbreaks, governments have begun report-
ing outbreaks more frequently and more accurately (Fidler 2004). Likewise, the WHO’s
authority has also expanded to prescribing acceptable medical practices. Throughout the
late 1990’s, the WHO was fundamental in providing recommendations concerning the man-
agement of disease. In 2000, the WHO created the Global Observation Alert Response
Network (GOARN) which provides advice on best health practices from health experts to
ministries of health (Heymann & Rodier 1998, World Health Organization 2004, World
Health Organization 2002, Zacher 2007) . Moreover, the WHO secretariat has not only
increased the number of its recommendations, but has also become increasingly willing to
publicly criticize states that do not comply with those recommendations. For example, dur-
ing an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the WHO issued travel
advisories for areas of China as well as the city of Toronto (Fidler 2004, Zacher 2007). Yet,
even though cooperation on health may now cover a variety of objectives, particularly within
developing states, control of specific communicable diseases remains one of the primary focal
points of cooperation.
Of these new objectives, many require more than state level compliance with established
regulations. Likewise, such initiatives require considerable financial support and a variety of
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organizations and programs have been developed to satisfy the demand for greater health
funding. International health initiatives now includes a diverse range of actors – states,
multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations and philanthropic foundations –
providing funding for these activities. As a result, cooperation on global health has become
an expansive and complex coordination game. Although much of the literature assumes
that international cooperation should lead to more efficient outcomes, I contend that the
growing number of actors and changes in objectives has increased the opportunities for
politics resulting in discontinuities between development aid for health and need. This
project examines how allocations of development aid for health may be distorted as a result
of donor interests.
1.2 Development Aid for Health
The most obvious and extensive method of health cooperation is the provision of development
aid for health. DAH programs provide financial and material aid for improving health
standards in developing countries. Since the early 1990’s, the programs have expanded
tremendously. In the early 1990’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a whole declined
significantly. Yet, during this time, DAH continued a slow but steady increase. Between 1990
and 1995 measured approximately $2 billion per year. By 2004, this had risen to $14 billion
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007, Gottret & Schieber 2006).
The trend of increased assistance for health can be seen across both bilateral and multilateral
channels. Although some of this increase was due to aggregate increases in all sectors of
ODA, some of this increase reflects a change in prioritization of ODA funds. For example,
of ODA contributed by New Zealand between 1996 and 1998, none was DAH. Between
2002 and 2004 however, 10 percent of New Zealand’s ODA was specified as DAH. This
trend is observed among many state donors including Canada, Finland, Sweden, the UK,
and Ireland (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009). A similar
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trend is observed among some non-state donors. Aggregate DAH from UN agencies rose
from an average of US$1.6 billion a year from 1997-1999 to US$2 billion in 2002 (World
Health Organization 2002, Hecht & Shah 2006, Zacher & Keefe 2008). Similarly, World
Bank funding for health was virtually non-existent in 1990. However, new commitments for
health are estimated to have risen from about US$1 billion in 2001 to US$1.7 billion in 2003
of which $507 million was specifically directed at communicable diseases (Alberinni, Cooper,
Kurpnick & Simon 2005, Hecht & Shah 2006, Zacher & Keefe 2008).1
1.2.1 Diseases and Priorities
Development aid for health is directed at a diverse range of initiatives including provision
of basic health care, development of health infrastructure, medical service training, policy
and administrative management, medical research, reproductive health, family planning and
infectious disease control. Of these initiatives, infectious disease control arguably produces
some of the most “public” benefits. While the effects of infrastructure, training, reproductive
health and basic health care are generally enjoyed by individuals or local populations, the
benefits of infectious disease control and medical research are most certainly transnational.
Diminished threat of and improved responses to diseases enhances health for individuals
as well as local and global populations. As a result, disease control efforts have remained
a central focus of international health cooperation over the last several decades. Indeed,
infectious disease control is generally among the top two initiatives in terms of aid allocations
(the other being policy and administrative management). Between 1990 and 1998, disease
control efforts comprised roughly 20 percent of DAH. This had grown to 37 percent by 2004
(World Health Organization 2007, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
2009).
Historically, disease control has been directed at diseases that cross borders and pose an
1Scholars, including the authors cited hear, generally agree that a lack of comprehensive and organized
development aid for health data make estimations difficult. These numbers should be taken as educated
guesses.
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economic threat to states. As previously noted, outbreaks of cholera and bubonic plague not
only devastated populations, but also burdened international trade (Sigfried 1965, Goodman
1971, Zacher 2007). Recent efforts to control disease however, reflect the universality of the
Alma Alta declaration and address both international health as well as localized economic
concerns. For example, tuberculosis (TB), and in particular the spread of drug resistant TB
in industrialized countries, has increased interest in controlling this once neglected disease.
In addition to this global threat, parasitic diseases such as trypanosomiasis, guinea worm,
and malaria have also gained increased attention, as have vaccination initiatives for polio and
measles - two diseases virtually eliminated in developed societies (World Health Organization
2002, World Health Organization 2007). Each of these efforts produces benefits, however
the distribution of those benefits varies. Measles, polio and guinea worm are all diseases
that can be fully eradicated, like small pox. Monitoring and containing the spread of TB
prevents further spread of the disease and increased microbial resistance, immediate benefits
shared by countries across the globe. Prevention and treatment for parasitic diseases such
as trypanosomiasis and malaria produces the benefits of decreased infections and improved
health for populations within the diseases geographic range. Finally, investing in prevention
has the potential for larger international payoffs. These differences in benefits alters donors’
incentive to invest in disease control activities for each of these diseases.
Despite sharing many benefits, international donors and recipient states may develop dif-
fering or even conflicting priorities in health policy. For example, developing states are faced
with an array of diseases varying in severity, transmission and treatability. Many diseases
that are easily prevented or treated in developed states are of serious concerns for developing
states. Poverty stricken, nutrient deprived populations suffer increased vulnerability, turn-
ing diseases that would be inconsequential elsewhere into a serious, often life-threatening,
concern in developing states. Treatment for many such diseases, though relatively inexpen-
sive in developed states, is often beyond the fiscal means of those in the developing world.
Such diseases are often not viewed as a serious threat to international health — despite their
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potentially devastating consequences in developing states — and thus gain little attention
among international organizations. Despite the growing percentage of DAH that is directed
toward disease control, the allocation of that aid remains a complex story. Indeed, MacKel-
lar (2005) found that variation in disease burden and disability-adjusted life years across 10
diseases had little correlation to donor aid allocations for those diseases. Similarly, Shiffman
(2006) found that acute respiratory infections represented more than a quarter of the total
developing world disease burden among the 10 diseases. Despite its crushing burden, acute
respiratory infections receive less than 2.5 percent of direct funding (Shiffman 2006). Most
DAH directed at disease control is largely focused upon one particular disease - HIV/AIDS.
As noted above, by 2004, the proportion of DAH allocated to disease control had reached
37 percent. Of this, two-thirds was directed at HIV/AIDS and other STIs (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development 2009). Because diseases vary considerably in terms
of mortality rates, geographic spread, and cost, it is possible to use differences across diseases
to identify donor priorities in the allocation of disease specific aid. I examine differences in
funding levels across disease using these disease characteristics as measures of donor interest
in controlling a given disease.
1.2.2 Donors
The increase in DAH has also been accompanied by a proliferation of donors. The cur-
rent international health regime is comprised of six types of international donors: state
governments, intergovernmental organizations, development banks, non-governmental orga-
nizations, philanthropic foundations and private businesses. The largest donors of bilateral
aid are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Although
the members of the DAC remain the largest donors, many new donors have joined their ranks,
including Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Korea, and China (World Health Organization 2002, World
Health Organization 2007, Zacher & Keefe 2008, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development 2009). The rest of DAH consists of contributions by intergovernmental
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organizations, development banks, non-governmental organizations, philanthropic founda-
tions and private businesses. The agencies affiliated with the United Nations, such as the
World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the
United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
and the Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) all distribute some level of
health assistance. Development banks have also begun to play an increasingly important
role in the provision of DAH. The connection of poor health to disheartening economic per-
formance has improved the value of health investments in the view of financial institutions.
The World Bank Group is now the largest multilateral donor of DAH. In addition to these
donors, NGOs such as the Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Christian Children’s
Fund (CCF), and the Carter Center and philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation and the John G. Rockefeller Foundation all provide much needed
funding for health. Finally, and more recently, private businesses have become important
contributors of DAH. Pharmaceutical companies spent 564 million dollars in 2002 sponsoring
the provision of vaccines and remedial drugs (Zacher & Keefe 2008).
Despite the vast array of actors contributing aid for health, all donors claim to share a
unified goal of preventing, containing and treating disease. Unlike other issues subject to
international cooperation, actors in global health agree upon the nature of problems faced,
have shared goals and, agree upon the technical actions necessary to accomplish the desired
outcomes (Chen, Evans & Cash 1999, Perin & Attaran 2003, Widdus 2001). Unlike other
types of foreign aid, the causes of disease are known and commonly identified, as are the
preventive measure, treatments and cures. Under such conditions, the coordination of DAH
for disease control and public health support should be relatively straightforward and free
of political distortion. As a result, scholars studying foreign aid have generally neglected
public health as a non-political matter directed by technical specialists (Kickbusch 2003, Lee
& Zwi 2003, Fidler 2003, Kates, Morrison & Lief 2006, Kates & Lief 2007). Yet, despite the
high level of consensus among actors and the shared benefits of improved health, promotion of
11
public health remains a matter of strategic political calculations. There remains considerable
tension among various entities - IGO’s, development banks, donor and recipient governments,
etc. - regarding health policy, how the financial burden should be borne and how the limited
funds should be spent.
These donors provide desperately needed resources to developing states facing continued
poor health, economic stagnation and the possibility of destabilization as a result. However,
despite the billions of dollars spent as DAH, the gap between demand and need remains
quite large. Moreover, although foreign aid is often seen as humanitarian in nature, these
donors are not without their own interests. Donors make allocation decisions based upon
need as well as donors’ health interests. Variations across disease result in a wide spectrum
of potential threat levels. For example, geographically limited disease pose little threat to
the global population as a whole whereas pandemic influenza poses a threat to populations
worldwide. I use variations in disease burden across donors as an objective measure of the
threat a disease may pose to various populations. I then use this measure of threat as a
means of testing the influence of donors’ health interests on their allocation of aid across
diseases.
1.2.3 Recipients
Despite growing numbers of donors and volumes of aid, demand for DAH continues to out-
pace supply. In 2001 The Millennium Development Goals Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health argued that a donor commitment of 27 billion US dollars a year would be nec-
essary to meet the health needs of the developing world (Millennium Development Goals
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001, Wagstaff & Fang 2006). Actual donor
commitments in 2003 were only 8 billion US dollars, less than one third of the necessary
amount (Hecht & Shah 2006, Wagstaff & Fang 2006). As a result, there remains ongoing
competition over the limited resources available to control communicable diseases in devel-
oping states. Donors and recipients may differ what they view as their health priorities. For
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example, while a donor might view HIV/AIDS as a more pressing issue, malaria may have
a higher disease burden and thus be of greater concern for the recipient state. However,
with limited resources available and high levels of competition for those resources, donors’
may face the dilemma of either allocating aid according to recipient need or distributing aid
strategically according to their own interests. I use recipient burden of disease to account
for recipient need for aid directed at a specific disease. Using this as an objective measure,
I am able to examine if donors allocate aid based upon recipient need or if allocations are
skewed according to donors’ interests.
Just as with other types of foreign aid, donors’ interests will vary across recipient and may
influence DAH allocations. Despite the high level of rhetorical agreement on the purposes of
DAH, donors may also view development aid for health as an opportunity to promote eco-
nomic and political interests. Thus, I include a measure for colonial legacy between donors
and recipients to account for the potential political and economic interest of donors. Addi-
tionally, recipients of DAH range from middle to low income countries. Moreover, potential
recipients vary tremendously across population, institutional capacity, and health system
structure. Similar to other forms of foreign aid, DAH donors may take these recipient level
characteristics into account when making DAH allocation decisions. These may ultimately
skew allocations toward recipients with more capacity and better health systems instead of
toward those with fewer resources and greater need. Alternatively, these factors may skew
allocations towards poorer recipient regardless of the relative need for a particular disease.
1.3 Project Summary
This project addresses one key puzzle at two distinct levels. The puzzle hinges upon variation
in funding across diseases. The international consensus that poor health anywhere is a
threat to good health everywhere might lead one to suspect funding should reflect need.
Specifically, one would expect greater resources to be dedicated to diseases with greater
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disease burden. This, however, is not the case. Some diseases such as HIV/AIDS receive a
disproportionately large portion of international funds. Still other high burden diseases, such
as acute respiratory infections and measles, receive little international funding. Additionally,
some lower burden diseases such as polio, leprosy and trachoma receive quite high levels of
funding. This disparities between the burden of disease and level of aid indicates that,
despite the general agreement surrounding health aid, DAH is being allocated according
to other factors beyond need. In the next chapter, I develop a theory explaining how and
why these discontinuities occur and test the theory on data from two different levels of aid
allocation decisions.
At first level I examine donor allocations of DAH by disease. Using aggregate levels
of aid allocated by a single donor, to a single recipient, and directed a specific disease, I
model donor funding decisions across disease. Using variations across disease characteristics
including geographic spread, and cost, as well as differences across donors’ and recipients’
burden of disease, I am able to identify patterns in DAH allocations in connection with
recipient need and donor interests. My results suggest that some types of donors provide
more funding for diseases that threaten populations in industrialized countries.
At the second level, I extend the theory proposed in the next chapter and consider how
political forces may also alter what activities donors choose to support through development
aid for health. Because prevention and control of disease is a primary objective among all
actors, it is reasonable to expect that, not only do donors’ spend more money on diseases
that threaten larger populations, but also that donors are more likely to provide aid to
support surveillance, monitoring and outbreak control activities. I examine the likelihood of
donors allocating aid for specific activities based upon variation across disease characteristics.
My results suggest that, while some donor may provide aid strategically across diseases,
at the activity level donors are more likely to provide aid for activities viewed as more
“humanitarian”
One of the core contributions of my dissertation is a new dataset on aid projects in the
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health sector. This dataset was constructed by collecting information on more than 60,000
health sector grants between 1995 and 2008. The grants represent development aid for health
from bilateral and multilateral donors, including all OECD countries, UN agencies, and
several development banks. Each grant is recorded as a donor/recipient dyad. In addition to
donor and recipient level data, each dyad also includes disease specific information including
disease burden. Using this dataset, I find that donor priorities often differ vastly from the
health needs of developing states. The theory and the subsequent empirical analyses suggest
that the distributional effects of political processes detract from the normative outcomes
of disease control. Moreover, the project suggests that political processes result in the
undersupply of disease control and international health conceptualized as public goods.
1.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge
This project offers several contributions to the collective political science knowledge. First,
despite similarities between health and other areas of cooperation, international health co-
operation has thus far been neglected by scholars. Likewise, development aid for health has
largely been overlooked by scholars studying foreign aid. This neglect has been due pri-
marily to the assumption that health is essentially an apolitical issue. This assumption to
which scholars and policy-makers alike subscribe, addresses international health as a tech-
nical problem to which international health is an answer (Gallup & Sachs 2001, Jamison,
Sachs & Wang 2001). Little academic attention has considered the potential impact of po-
litical forces on international health cooperation (Fidler 2003). If the conventional view of
international cooperation on health is correct, disease specific development assistance should
correspond to burden of disease. This project identifies an anomaly in international health
funding - disparity between disease specific DAH allocations and burden of disease - and
uses theories of public goods and foreign aid allocation to explain this anomaly.
Additionally, international health presents a unique cooperation scenario. Cooperation
scholars have long argued that the primary source of inefficiency in international cooperation
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is lack of consensus among actors regarding problems and solutions. Unlike other areas of
cooperation, international health is largely characterized by consensus. Participants share
identical objectives - the elimination of health threats - and, agree upon technical solutions
for achieving those objectives. Yet, to presume that this consensus has resulted in seamless
cooperation and optimal policies is short-sighted. While, there is very little conflict over what
is to be done, conflicts over how it should be done remain. Conflicts over the application and
distribution of the “solution” produce opportunities for political maneuvering and distortions
in allocations despite consensus.
Finally, in examining DAH allocations’ deviation from disease burden, this project relies
upon an extensive original dataset. Using grants provided by the AidData Development
Financing Tracking, I have examined more than 60,000 DAH grants. The end result is
a donor/recipient/disease triad dataset that includes donor, recipient and disease specific
variables.
1.3.2 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop a theory of
disease specific DAH allocations that explains the failure of DAH to match disease burden.
My theory addresses disease control through DAH as a semi-public good in which the benefits
of reduced rates of infection are enjoyed by everyone, but the payoff for improvements is
centralized in developing countries where poor health is most prevalent. Using this model,
efforts to control diseases with wider geographic spread and greater burden of disease will
likely produce the greatest payoffs for donors — even in recipient countries where other
geographically limited diseases may have a higher burden of disease. I use variations across
disease to illuminate the political preferences of donors. I argue that donors’ interests vary in
accordance with their own utility rather than with need. These interests, as defined by utility,
should be evident across several levels of analysis. This logic produces several hypotheses,
which I test in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I examine the impact of donor interests on
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DAH allocations across diseases through a series of large-n hierarchical models. In Chapter
4, I examine the impact of donor interests on DAH allocations across program activities
across diseases. Finally, in Chapter 5 I summarize my findings, review their theoretical and
empirical importance and discuss possible avenues for future research on development aid
for health and international health in general.
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Chapter 2
Disease Control and Donor Priorities
Rates of infection and ability to control communicable diseases vary greatly across states.
Developing states, with weak health systems and few resources face daunting rates of infec-
tion. In contrast, developed states, with advanced health systems and a relative abundance
of resources, enjoy relatively low rates of infection and mortality. Examples of international
cooperation, such as the eradication of smallpox, suggest that through collective action,
all actors – rich and poor – can enjoy the benefits of infectious disease control (Attaran
& Sachs 2001). Growing levels of international funding reflect growing international con-
cern over the spread of disease and shared belief that collaborative efforts can produce
additional successes. Despite the growth in development aid for health (DAH) however,
many developing states continue to struggle with diseases easily prevented and/or treated
in developed states, as well as geographically limited diseases such as malaria (Lopez &
Murray 2006, Hotez 2008). Because developing states are often reliant upon health funding
from international donors, examining the distribution of disease specific development aid for
health (DAH) may shed light upon some of these inconsistencies (Drager, Camen, Fouad &
Genberg 1992, MacKellar 2005, Webber & Kremer 2001).
DAH is often viewed as a humanitarian endeavor and relatively free of political distortions
(Fidler 2003, Kickbusch 2003, Lee & Zwi 2003). In aggregate however, international financial
support does not accurately reflect actual disease burdens (MacKellar 2005, Shiffman 2006).
For example, Shiffman (2006) found that acute respiratory infections which account for
roughly 26 percent of aggregate disease burden receives only 2.5 percent of aggregate funds.
In contrast tuberculosis, which accounts for roughly 9 percent of aggregate disease burden
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and polio, which accounts for 0.04 percent of aggregate disease burden each receives approx-
imately 7 percent of aggregate funds(Global Burden of Disease Project 2003, Millennium
Development Goals Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001).
When DAH is disaggregated it is possible to observe differences in funding priorities
across donors. For example, while the World Bank gives primarily to programs addressing
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria and Polio, (World Health Organization 2007, Alberinni
et al. 2005) some donors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and New Zealand’s
bilateral donation program, seek out high-burden diseases that are underfunded by other
organizations (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2010, Kates & Lief 2007).
The provision of foreign aid by international donors has drawn increasing attention among
scholars, however, little of this attention has been directed at development assistance for
health (McGillivary 1989, Neumayer 2003a, Lancaster 2006). Examining DAH using the
theoretical frameworks used to study other forms of development assistance provides some
insight into trends in DAH allocation. Studies of other types of foreign aid provide two the-
oretical explanations for the allocation of aid — recipient need and donor interests. I apply
these frameworks to development aid for health. However, DAH differs from other forms
of development aid in some key ways. Unlike other forms of aid, all actors involved agree
upon the problems and solutions toward which DAH is directed. Yet, because improvements
to disease control can be shared beyond the borders of the recipient states, it is essential
to theorize about the affects of this distributional structure on potential determinants of
DAH. Identifying patterns in DAH not only extends the previous foreign aid literature to an
under-studied area, it also provides fertile ground for examining donor behavior and studying
the politics of distribution. Relying upon the previous literature, I examine the distribution
of disease specific DAH as determined by a mix of need and donor interest. I argue that
some international donors attempt to maximize the payoff they receive from DAH through
strategic allocation of funds. Donors’ calculations seek to maximize the political benefits to
donors rather than address diseases that burden the health of the most people. Examination
19
of disease specific allocations is academically and practically important as policy decisions
may divert funding from high-burden diseases. Where health funding does not reflect need,
the consequences may be grave, including increased, disease, disability, and death.
2.1 Theories of Foreign Aid Allocations
Studies of foreign aid have identified several explanations for the allocation of foreign aid,
which I argue can reasonably be applied to DAH funding (Hook 1995, Lancaster 1999).
Although foreign aid is often regarded as altruism by the general public, the literature sug-
gests a more complex set of motivations. According to Dollar and Levin (2006) some donors
take recipient need as measured by prevalence of poverty, and economic development into
account while others do not. As a result, the foreign aid literature prescribes a theoret-
ical framework that accounts for a combination of humanitarianism and selfish interests
(Neumayer 2003a, Lancaster 1999, Lancaster 2006).
The most obvious motivation for foreign aid is recipient need. Rhetorically, policymakers
tend to portray foreign aid as an attempt to relieve suffering. Indeed, the US Agency for
International Development (USAID)- the agency responsible for billions of dollars of US
bilateral foreign aid - states its mission as “improving the lives of citizens of the developing
world...by extending assistance to countries recovering from disaster, escaping poverty or
engaging in democratic reforms.” Such rhetoric has led to a pervading public view that
foreign aid expenditures are based upon need. Recipient need as a motivator for foreign aid
allocations presumes that donors are target recipients with the lowest income, identify and
respond to the greatest barriers to development and/or the most pressing humanitarian con-
cerns (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor 1998, Neumayer 2003b, Alesina & Dollar 2000). Previous
literature has adopted several measures to operationalize a recipients level of need, including
GDP per capita and average life expectancy. Although the literature produces mixed results,
there is some support for need as a determinant of foreign aid (Apodaca & Stohl 1999, ?, ?).
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For example, Neumayer (2003) finds that, across bilateral and multilateral donors, a recip-
ients total economic development aid as a total of all ODA is highly correlated with lower
GDP per capita. (Neumayer 2003a). Likewise, Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) examine
aid allocations from France, Japan, Sweden and the United States to 36 recipients. The
findings of this study indicate that all donors provide more aid to poorer countries. These
findings suggest that one should expect greater levels of development aid to be targeted at
the poorest countries.
Although recipient need is the most prominent rhetorical explanation of foreign aid alloca-
tions, many studies of foreign aid indicate that donors’ interest is an equally, if not more, pow-
erful predictor of foreign aid allocations (Frey & Schneider 1986, Schraeder, Hook & Taylor
1998, Alesina & Dollar 2000, Neumayer 2003a, Anderson, Hansen & Markussen 2006, East-
erly & Pfutze 2008, Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009, Moyo 2009). Such studies suggest that
foreign aid allocations are determined by donors’ strategic political interests across a variety
of issues. During the Cold war, strategic political interests equated to the security/military
interests of donor state. Specifically, a potential recipient’s strategic importance to a donor’s
security interests was regarded as a key determinant of foreign aid allocations. After the Cold
War ended, the definition of strategic political interests broadened. Scholars of all stripes
now acknowledge a potential role for economic and policy interests. Donor interest in trade,
investment, shared values, and specific policy outcomes are often included in studies of for-
eign aid (Frey & Schneider 1986, Alesina & Dollar 2000, Neumayer 2003a, Bueno de Meqsuita
& Smith 2007, Bueno de Meqsuita & Smith 2009). Variables such as bilateral trade flows,
alliance portfolio similarity, and colonial legacy recur throughout the literature as useful
predictors of receipt and levels of aid. Indeed, considerable research indicates that bilateral
aid flows generally reflect donor interests better than recipient need (Hook 1995, Schraeder,
Hook & Taylor 1998, Alesina & Dollar 2000, Wolf 2007)
Donor preferences and how they affect foreign aid decisions will depend upon both
the type of donor and the problems being addressed. Different types of donors will cer-
21
tainly have different interests as well as different constituencies to which they are account-
able. Such variations will undoubtedly influence donors’ interests as applied to foreign
aid(Berthelemy 2006, Alesina & Dollar 2000). For example, decision-makers in a bilateral
donor state will be heavily influenced by the preferences of voters within that state. Foreign
aid monies are domestic tax dollars allocated to non-citizen populations. Despite arguments
that these funds promote citizens’ interests overseas, foreign aid in all forms is often con-
troversial (Sogg 2002). Indeed, despite making up less than one half of one percent of the
US budget, a recent survey by The Economist indicates that Americans overwhelmingly
select foreign aid as the most likely area for budget cuts in hard economic times (Economist
2010). The preferences of domestic audiences undoubtedly constrain donor resources and
increase pressure upon decisions-makers to allocate aid based upon constituents’ interests.
In response to such pressures, donors are strategic with regard to the programs they choose
to fund. State governments may strategically select programs that are least objectionable to
their constituencies. For example, US food aid is more appealing to voters in the US than
long term projects directed at broadly defined objectives such as “economic development.”
Food aid it is often viewed as an essential humanitarian activity in response to a specific
need — the solution for hunger is to provide food. Moreover and the removal of surplus
agricultural goods from the US market directly benefits American farmers. In contrast,
the problems associated with development and democratization do not have such clear and
simple solutions. Moreover, the solutions that are offered do not provide a specific benefit
to constituents within the donor states. Alternatively, governments may select programs
that have particular appeal or value to their constituencies. Such is the case of USAID’s
democracy and governance programs. Public sentiment regarding the benefits of democracy,
coupled with the spread of the democratic peace thesis, has made democracy promotion one
of the fasted growing foreign aid initiative conducted by USAID (United States Agency for
International Development 2010).
In contrast, foreign aid given through multilateral channels may be less constrained. Be-
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cause IGOs’ constituencies are state governments rather than voters within a single state,
foreign aid allocations will reflect a more diverse range of interests and preferences. Indeed,
Maizels and Nissanke (1984) suggests that recipient need is a more effective predictor of
aid allocations through multilateral than bilateral channels. Likewise, Thiele et al. (2007)
analyzes aid portfolios of bilateral and multilateral donors. In comparing aid allocations
to Millennium Development Goal targets, they find that multilateral donors’ allocations
are more likely to reflect need than those of bilateral donors. Studies of IGOs such as the
European Community support this, finding that physical quality of life measures have sig-
nificant impact upon aid allocations (Tsoutsoplides 1991). Likewise, because philanthropic
organizations represent constituencies that have a primarily humanitarian focus, their pref-
erences will also vary in comparison to state governments and IGOs, although little research
is available to confirm or deny this.
Donors may also strategically select recipients - selecting recipients that are considered
most promising, most receptive or that are most appealing to constituents. One recipient
selection criteria addressed above, is the relative income level of recipients. By definition, aid
is intended to assist low income states. Additionally, a growing body of literature suggests
that governance structures are an important factor in selecting recipients (McKinlay &
Little 1977, Svensson 2000, Neumayer 2003a, Dollar & Levin 2006, Winters 2010). Studies
incorporating good governance, as conceptualized as a wide variety of factors including civil
rights, lack of corruption, and/or rule of law (see Neumayer 2003 for summary), generally find
a positive relationship between good governance and foreign aid (Cingranelli & Pasquarello
1985, Apodaca & Stohl 1999, Alesina & Dollar 2000, Burnside & Dollar 2004, Winters 2010).
This result, which extends across bilateral and multilateral donors, is not surprising. Offered
the opportunity to select recipients, it is reasonable to expect donors to select recipients
that are most likely to show some improvement. There is also some evidence that cultural
similarity, ideological stance, religion, or recent publicity may contribute to a recipient being
viewed as a worthwhile investment by bilateral donors (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor 1998). As
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a result, donor selectivity toward recipients may distort foreign aid allocations away from
the rhetorically supported explanation of recipient need.
These frameworks of foreign aid allocation provide some initial explanations for how
development aid for health might be allocated. Table 2.1 summarizes three categories of
potential foreign aid determinants — recipient need, donor interest, and good governance.
For each of these categories, the table offers examples of variables used within the literature
and example article in which that variable is used. These determinants of foreign aid provide
a useful starting point for theorizing about the allocations of development aid for health.
Indeed, each of these broad categories of determinants is likely to explain portions of disease
specific health aid.
2.1.1 Applying Theories of Foreign Aid to Development Aid for
Health
Portions of the theories addressed above may be easily applied to development aid for health.
In terms of health funding and disease control, recipient need suggests that donors seek
solutions for and target diseases that pose the greatest threat to the health of individuals in
developing states. Thus, one would expect funding allocations to be directed toward diseases
that affect the most lives in the poorest countries.
Donor interest can also be easily applied to development aid for health. Just as with
other forms of foreign aid, donors may seek to satisfy strategic political or health concerns
through the use of DAH. Donors may use DAH to improve the health and safety of their
own constituencies. For example, after rises in tuberculosis rates in the United States and
Western Europe throughout the 1990s, the US Congress authorized significant increases
in funding to control tuberculosis overseas. During the same time the disease received
increased attention from international organizations such as the WHO (Raviglione, Sudre &
Rieder 1992). Donors may also use DAH to address economic concerns. For example, labor
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force health is a fundamental consideration in foreign direct investment and establishment
of multinational corporations. If the constituents in the donors state are heavily invested
in recipient states, these economic factors may encourage funding for the control of diseases
such as HIV/AIDS, which are major economic burdens or affect individuals during their
most productive years (Webber & Kremer 2001, Widdus 2001).
The potential for various types of donors to impact foreign aid extends well to DAH as
well. Just as with other forms of development aid, the diversity of donors providing DAH
is just as varied as those providing other forms of development aid. The current interna-
tional health regime is comprised of six types of international donors: state governments,
intergovernmental organizations, development banks, non-governmental organizations, phil-
anthropic foundations and private businesses. Different types of donors will have different
interests depending upon their constituency’s preferences. Because large portions of health
aid are provided by bilateral donors, these allocations will likely be correlated with localized
interests. Those interests will inevitably vary from one state donor to another. Bilateral
donors are primarily characterized as industrialized democracies. Recently however, interest
in funding health initiatives has expanded. As of 2006 Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Korea, and
China all provided bilateral aid for health (Hecht & Shah 2006, Zacher & Keefe 2008, Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009)1. Differences in socioeconomic
standing, health systems and geography will inevitably create variation in preferences across
these state donors.
The remaining portion of DAH consists of contributions by intergovernmental organiza-
tions, development banks, non-governmental organizations, philanthropic foundations and
private businesses. As the foreign aid framework suggests, each of these various types of
donors is engaged in a different mission and is accountable to a different constituency. As
a result, one would expect DAH decisions to vary across types of donors just as it does for
other types of foreign aid.
1China is a particularly interesting example as it is also a recipient
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Finally, just as the literature on other types of aid suggests, donor may select recipient
of development aid for health strategically. Recipient characteristics may influence DAH
decisions just as with other forms of foreign aid. Donors may select recipients based upon
governance, infrastructure, and the level of support for the health system, in addition to the
level of illness and death within that country. In the simplest model, one might expect the
domestic level of disease to be a primary factor in the selection recipient states. However,
it is also essential to consider how these factors may differ in the case of health aid. For
example, unlike other forms of foreign aid, factors such as political and civil rights, levels
of democratization, and corruption may be of less concern to donors than characteristics
like health system infrastructure. The perceived necessity and humanitarian imperative
associated with DAH may spur donors to give aid to even the most corrupt and authoritarian
regimes. Indeed, corrupt and/or authoritarian states are often among the most desperate
for DAH. This desperation, as well as the broad benefits associated with improved disease
control, may entice donors to provide funding despite a recipient’s poor performance in
these measures of good governance. In contrast, recipient levels of health funding and
health system organization may be of greater importance in donor selectivity. Without the
semblance of infrastructure or some minimal health system, disease specific DAH may be
difficult to distribute and of little benefit to the recipient or any other actor.
Although development assistance for health can be loosely modeled using this framework,
as demonstrated above, additional modifications are needed to accurately explain variations
in donor interests. Other forms of development aid are intended to produce improvements
to economic, social and political conditions within a specific recipient states. In addition to
these improvements, which primarily benefit the recipient states, non-DAH development aid
also may indirectly produce benefits for the donor state. In comparison, disease specific DAH
may produce a benefits that are shared by a broad range of actors including the recipient,
donor, and the global system as a whole. As a result, communicable disease control can
be and is increasingly viewed as a public good (Zacher & Keefe 2008, Smith, Woodward,
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Acharya, Beaglhole & Drager 2004, ?, Fidler 2003). Thus, the nature of infectious disease
control and the distribution of its benefits alter donors’ incentives in ways not accounted for
in the initial foreign aid framework.
2.2 A Theory of Development Aid for Health
The preceding application of the general foreign aid framework to development aid for health
provides an initial view of DAH allocations as a political outcome. Although this view is
a needed improvement to the understanding of DAH as an apolitical outcome, it fails to
address some fundamental difference between DAH and other forms of development aid.
By considering disease specific DAH a public good, it is possible to describe how donors’
interests might differ in this sector as compared to other sectors of giving. Moreover, using
variations across disease, recipients, disease control activity and donors I am able to explain
discontinuities between aid allocations need.
2.2.1 Infectious Disease Control as a Semi-Public Good
The economic theory of public goods provides two criteria that must be met for a good to
be truly public. First, a public good must be non-excludable. Once a public good has been
produced by one actor, other actors cannot be prevented from enjoying the benefits of this
good. Second, a public good must be non-rivalrous. One actors’ use of the good, cannot
deplete another actors’ use or enjoyment of the good. While economists generally view
individual level health as a private good, public health bears the primary markers of a public
good. Governments often intervene to maximize the health of populations by providing goods
that individuals cannot provide for themselves, for example health research. Among these
efforts, control of communicable diseases is distinctly public in its nature. Prevention or
successful treatment of a communicable disease not only benefits the individual, but has
direct positive benefits for others by reducing the risk of infection. Similarly, the reduction
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of disease in a single state reduces the risk of spread to other states. At both the individual
and the state level, the benefit of reduced risk of infection is both non-excludable and non-
rivalrous. No individual or state can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of decreased
infection rates, thus it is non-excludable. Likewise, one individuals or states’ enjoyment
of decreased rates of infection does not prevent other individuals from enjoying the same
benefits. Indeed, unlike other public good examples - the classic lighthouse - each individuals’
enjoyment of the benefits is enhanced as more individuals enjoy the benefits of disease control.
Consider the case of smallpox. Efforts to eradicate smallpox were disjointed and re-
lied heavily upon the contributions of a handful of states. Despite the disparate levels of
contributions, today all states enjoy the benefits the of the eradication of smallpox, even
if they did not actively contribute. Moreover, unlike other examples of public goods, the
benefits of eradication are unlimited. While specific states contributed over a period of two
decades, once eradication was achieved, the benefits are permanent - extending across all
future generations.
In the same manner, poor public health and unchecked spread of disease can be concep-
tualized as a public bad. Globally, communicable disease accounted for 26 percent of deaths
in 2000 (Lopez & Murray 2006, Hotez 2008). The advent of globalization and improved
transportation has also enabled broader and faster spread of disease as well. Efforts by
individual states to improve domestic health, however, are often threatened by the spread
of communicable disease across state borders. In an international system where differences
in resources produce immense variation in state capacity to control the spread of disease,
resource rich states have incentives to reduce these externalities by extending their efforts
to populations beyond their own borders, often in the form of DAH. This project will focus
on the use of disease-specific DAH as an investment in communicable disease control.
These externalities are not limited solely to health. Increasingly, poor health, disease
outbreaks, and full pandemics are regarded not only as a threat to the health of global
populations but also as an international threat to peace and security. Aside from the direct
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threat of biological weapons and draining of state capacity as a result of health burdens
(United Nations Security Council 2000, Fidler 2003, United Nations Security Council 2005),
this focus has increasingly accepted indirect health threats to national security. HIV/AIDS,
SARS, and Avian flu have all been cited as threats to security and global peace (United
Nations Security Council 2000, Fidler 2003, World Health Organization 2003, World Health
Organization 2007). Security analyses have increasingly included HIV/AIDS as a primary
source of destabilization in African states (HIV and National Security: Where are the Links?
2005, Kirton 2004). Moreover, states where disease contributes to societal instability, societal
tension and violence increase the spread of disease as military troops move to maintain order
and populations migrate to more stable areas.
Likewise, the consequences of disease are increasingly being identified as an obstacle to
economic development. Diseases throughout the world produce negative effects on economic
productivity including reduction in GDP, decreases in worker productivity, labor shortages,
increased financial burdens on household units, reduction in per capita income, reduced
savings, and increases in income inequalities within and across societies (Millennium Devel-
opment Goals Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001, United Nations Security
Council 2000, World Health Organization 2003, World Health Organization 2007). The
spread of HIV/AIDS throughout sub-Saharan Africa poses a particularly graphic illustra-
tion of the economic obstacles presented by disease. Many African states, some with infection
rates as high as 20 percent, are facing devastating losses in the supply of labor. As most
infected individuals become debilitated during their 30’s, the disease effectively eliminates
some of the most productive members of the work force (World Bank 2004). Households are
thus faced with financial burdens of caring for sick individuals while household income de-
clines; firms are faced with an ever shrinking workforce and decreased incentive for investing
in employees (e.g. training for increasingly technical positions); and, states face increasing
difficulty in attracting foreign investment while also dealing with the financial burdens of
poor health. These effects are particularly burdensome for developing states where infection
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rates tend to be highest and financial resources for combating illness the scarcest.
2.2.2 Variation Across Diseases
Although infectious disease control (IDC) meets the criteria of a public good, the geographic
distribution of diseases creates a grey area when considering how the benefits of infectious
disease control are distributed. Not all communicable diseases are global. Diseases such as
schistosomiasis, guinea worm, and other parasitic diseases are limited to areas hospitable to
the disease-causing organism or their intermediary hosts. Other diseases, such as measles,
polio, and cholera have been effectively eliminated or prevented in industrialized states
through immunization and improved sanitation. These variations in disease alter how the
benefits of improved disease control are distributed.
For example, influenza is extremely mobile. Because it is easily spread through casual
contact from one person to another and carriers are contagious even when no symptoms are
present, influenza spreads rapidly around the globe. Likewise, HIV/AIDS is not geograph-
ically limited. Because symptoms may not appear for 8-10 years and individuals may be
unaware of infection, it moves across borders with relative ease. As a result, globally there
are approximately 33 million individuals infected, with infections to be found in every state
in the international system (World Health Organization 2003, Global Burden of Disease
Project 2003, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 2008). Thus, states investing
DAH specifically for influenza and HIV/AIDS may share in the benefit of reduced rates of
infection.
In contrast, schistosomiasis - which can cause chronic illness, increased risks of cancer,
nervous system lesions, and damage to internal organs and is the second most socioeco-
nomically damaging parasitic disease in the world- is caused by blood fluke and cannot be
transmitted directly from one person to another (Weisbrod, Andreano, Baldwin, Epstein &
Kelley 1973). Each of the three species of flukes that cause schistosomiasis seek out a specific
species of fresh water snail to serve as a host. Once the flukes have matured, they exit the
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snails into pools of fresh water. When these trematodes come into contact with human flesh,
they then burrow into the skin, enter the blood stream and travel to the lungs, heart and
other organs. Because the flukes are dependent upon specific species of snails, schistosomi-
asis is geographically limited to areas hospitable to these intermediate hosts. Specifically,
these snails require temperatures between 10C and 35C (Weisbrod et al. 1973, World Health
Organization 2004, Hotez 2008). As a result, schistosomiasis is geographically limited to
tropical areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus, when non-endemic states invest
in efforts to control schistosomiasis, the resulting benefit is conditioned by the geographic
limits of the snails.
Many diseases are geographically limited as a result of medical advances. Diseases such as
polio, cholera, and measles no longer pose a serious medical threat in industrialized societies
with access to adequate health care. Advancements in medical treatments, immunization
programs, sanitation systems, and nutrition have all minimized the threat of countless dis-
eases to populations in developed states. Other diseases are only endemic in some countries,
but may spread under proper conditions. Malaria, now eradicated in the United States was
once endemic and saw a brief resurgence in the mid to late 60’s as military troops returned
from Vietnam. Trypanosomiasis -also known as sleeping sickness - is a parasitic disease that
is transmitted to humans via biting insects. Although historically limited to Africa, Asia
and Latin America, immigration from these areas has assisted the diseases spread - cases
of sleeping sickness have recently appeared in Europe (World Health Organization 2010b).
Likewise, despite aggressive vaccination programs, 131 cases of measles were reported in the
United States between January and July 2008 (Center for Disease Control 2010). Thus,
non-endemic states that invest DAH in diseases such a measles may receive some benefit,
but the payoff will be smaller than investments in diseases such as influenza or HIV/AIDS.
As a result, diseases that still pose a serious threat to populations in developing states, may
be neglected by donors.
In these cases, IDC remains non-rival and non-excludable, however, variation across
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diseases’ geographic spread conditions the payoff received by each actor. These differences
do not exclude a state from enjoying the benefits of reduced infection rates, but rather
diminish the ratio of payoff to investment. Because states where infection rates for specific
diseases are near zero have already reached the maximum threshold of benefits offered by
controlling those diseases, it is not possible for them to improve their payoff. In this way,
infectious disease control for geographically limited diseases is not a purely public good, but
rather more like a club good (Cornes & Sandler 1986). For example, elimination of polio
has not excluded any states from enjoying the benefit of lower infection rates. However,
states that have eliminated polio have already reached the pareto position as members of
the club of states that have eliminated polio. When polio has been eradicated, and all states
are members of the club, the good will become a public good. Likewise, the geographical
limitations of schistosomiasis does not prevent the United States from enjoying the benefit
of no infection, yet it is impossible for the U.S. to improve its enjoyment of decreased
infection. Thus, while IDC remains a public good, variation across diseases will determine
the distribution of the benefits. Variations in the globalness of diseases may alter incentives
and distort investments across diseases. Table 2.2 displays the diseases examined in this
project, as well as the relative geographic spread and whether efforts at controlling that
disease should be treated as public or club good.
For diseases with potential for global spread, failure to prevent, treat and contain infec-
tions can be seen as a global bad. Where developing states do not have the resources to
address global communicable diseases, the spread of disease across borders can be viewed
as an externality. As a result, donors have incentives to invest in IDC for diseases with po-
tential for wider geographic spread. By doing so, donors are investing in the public good of
infectious disease control and will enjoy a share of benefits — decreased spread of disease. In
contrast, diseases with geographic limitations produce only localized externalities. Although
guinea worm and malaria may spread across borders, there are limitations to how far they
can spread. Most industrialized states — those that are most likely to be donors — remain
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outside of the geographic range of these diseases — they are members of a club that already
enjoy the maximum benefits available for controlling geographically limited diseases. As a
result, donors have few incentives to invest development aid in diseases that are geographi-
cally limited, leading to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Greater levels of DAH will be allocated to diseases with potential for wider
geographical spread.
Proposition 2: Greater levels of DAH will be allocated to diseases that pose a greater
threat to populations in industrialized states.
2.2.3 Variation Across Donors
Allocation of DAH will most certainly reflect some combination of recipient need and donor
interest as suggested by the previously discussed foreign aid framework. Likewise, DAH
allocations should be expected to vary across different types of donors as well. This variation
not only provides potential insight into why DAH does not correspond to need as reflected by
disease burden, it also provides an opportunity to examine unique anomalies in cooperation.
Unlike other ares of foreign aid and cooperation, all of the actors involved in infectious disease
control agree upon the nature of the problem, share the objective of reducing the spread of
disease and even subscribe to a shared solution. Although the ultimate goals of international
health are widely agreed upon, divergent priorities remain. Variations in strategic political
and economic pressures across types of donors sheds light upon the divergent outcome in
DAH allocations despite this accord. For example, international organizations represent a
global audience are expected to focus on geographically unlimited diseases and devise policy
recommendations that minimize the threat of cross-border spread — thus a policies heavily
weighted toward testing, case identification and containment. States offering bilateral funds
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represent the interests of their domestic constituencies, thus they may focus funding toward
diseases that they perceive as a threat to their own citizens.
Thus, while donors share a primary goal of prevention of spread, there will often be
divergence regarding which diseases should be addressed and how the limited resources
available to implement such programs should be allocated among differing priorities. These
tensions create puzzling behaviors such as disproportionate allocation of aid across diseases,
and the use of different activities across similar diseases.
Bilateral Donors
Bilateral aid accounts for a large portion of total aid flow — and estimated 70% since
the 1970’s (Zacher & Keefe 2008, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
2007). Bilateral donors also provide the largest portion of development aid for health. Mem-
bers of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD provide the greatest
volume of aid — with the United States and the United Kingdom ranked as top contrib-
utors (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development 2009). Historically, bilateral aid for health was
not considered a separate aid sector. As a result aid spent on health was generally consid-
ered a component of other programs. 2 In the last twenty years, however, health has been
recognized as an independent sector and state-to-state aid contributions have increasingly
been driven by specific donor initiatives. For example, the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) — a US policy initiative — was developed with the express mis-
sion of combatting HIV/AIDS in 15 developing countries (President’s Emergency Plan for
Aids Relief 2010). Although the members of the DAC remain the largest donors, many new
donors have joined their ranks over the last two decades. Indeed, the number of donors states
funding health projects reached 56 in 2007 - the highest it has ever been (International De-
2Data on health aid is relatively sparse. Until the 1990’s, health aid was often recorded as other forms of
aid.
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velopment Association 2007). The list of bilateral donors now includes Saudi Arabia, Brazil,
Korea, Mexico, Turkey, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and China (Zacher &
Keefe 2008, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009).
As previously noted, bilateral DAH will likely be subject to a collection of donor related
political pressures. States may choose bilateral channels for contributions specifically because
these provide donors with more control over how aid money is used. Because bilateral
foreign aid dollars are citizen tax dollars, state governments will undoubtedly feel pressure
to invest according to their constituent’s interests and have incentive to maintain greater
control over aid spending. The reasons for this could be both humanitarian and political
in nature. Because DAH is often viewed as a humanitarian endeavor, citizens may expect
aid to be directed at humanitarian issues with which they are familiar. In these cases, it
is beneficial for governments to be able to claim specific humanitarian acts. Alternatively,
and probably more likely, bilateral aid allows donor governments’ to ensure that domestic
priorities are being met. For example, concerns within the electorate regarding the spread of
HIV/AIDS, H1N1 Influenza, SARS, or TB may encourage a donor government to increase
DAH. However, in order for this increase to translated into political payoff, it is necessary
for the government to demonstrate the money was spent on the diseases of concern to the
electorate rather than more pressing diseases that are of less interest. Factors that might
influence the electorate’s attention to a particular disease may include geographic spread,
means of transmission and cost of treatment.
The strategic calculations associated with bilateral aid extends beyond the selection of
an appropriate recipient or targeting a specific disease. Politically motivated allocation of
funding can also be directed at specific disease control activities within and across diseases.
For example, given a limited amount of DAH to be allocated, France may choose to focus
on HIV/AIDS because the French public is well informed about the disease, it can and has
spread within the US population, and the treatment costs are relatively high. Bilateral
contributions also give donors greater control over how the investment is spent. In this case,
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France might choose allocate money specifically for HIV/AIDS vaccine development because
the resulting vaccine would provide the greatest possible benefit to its constituency.
Donors’ attempts to satisfy constituent interests may have potentially detrimental effects
in developing countries. Although voters in developed democracies may have preferences
on how aid is spent, there is no indication that these preferences will produce positive
outcomes. An obvious example of this is the United States’ (PEPFAR) initiative. The
PEPFAR program focuses on reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS and the provision of anti-
retroviral medication in 15 countries. Although it represents the largest commitment of aid
by any single country for a specific disease, PEPFAR has also been internationally criticized
for its funding bias against safe sex programs. PEPFAR’s official HIV/AIDS prevention
policy is the “ABC program” — Abstinence, Be faithful, use a Condom. Although this
policy incorporates a safe sex component, the legislation authorizing the PEPFAR program
includes a 33% abstinence-until-marriage budgetary allocation (Institute of Medicine 2007).
Scientific research examining behavioral changes indicate that, while abstinence and fidelity
training produce no meaningful behavioral change, safe sex education programs result in a
marked increase in the use of condoms (Cohen & Tate 2005, Cleland & Ali 206). Moreover,
these budgetary constraints prevent the implementation of interventions specifically tailored
to the recipient country. Yet, despite international criticism, PEPFAR has been heavily
praised by conservatives in the United States.
The extent to which a donor government uses DAH to serve strategic political objectives
may vary considerably across factors. First, democratically elected governments would be ex-
pected to be more inclined to use DAH as a political tool than less democratic governments.
Greater accountability to voting constituencies increases the likelihood that a government
will need to serve political interests. Likewise, budget processes within democratic states
increase the potential for DAH allocations to become part of political discourse. Govern-
ments that are not democratically elected or whose constituencies are less able to hold them
accountable will have less reason to serve political interests and thus may be more free to use
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DAH to address need. Likewise, cultural differences across states will inevitably influence
how DAH is used. Thus, I propose the following:
Proposition 3: DAH allocations from bilateral donors will be more reflective of donor
interests than burden of disease
Multilateral Donors
Over the past 60 year, international organizations and institutions have become an increas-
ingly prevalent part of international relations. The use of formal institutions to coordinate
for purposes of health began with the International Sanitary Convention and has grown to
include other organizations such as the World Health Organization. Although multilateral
efforts to control disease have often taken the form of organization and agreements, over
the last thirty year, this has also grown to include the distribution of development aid. The
growth of multilateral health aid indicates growing global concern about the effects of poor
health and the spread of disease. Additionally, the distribution of aid through multilateral
channels reflects growing efforts to coordinate health assistance policy and allocations. De-
velopment aid for health is provided by a variety of multilateral organizations. These inter-
national organizations also represent the interests of their constituent populations, however,
constituent populations vary depending upon the organization.
International organizations are important and active participants in the distribution of
health aid to and development of health programs in developing countries. This category
includes global donors, such as the United Nations (UN), the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
TB and Malaria (Global Fund), the G8 organization, as well as regional donors, such as
the Organization of American States, and development banks such as the World Bank.
Just as with bilateral aid flows, aggregate values of multilateral aid flows have increased
substantially in the recent past — rising from $3.4 billion average in 1997 to more that $5.5
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billion in 2002 (Hecht & Shah 2006)3 Increases in bilateral aid also encouraged increases in aid
from international organizations. More governments providing bilateral health aid reflects
either shared goals, or concern about shared threats. Thus, it is unsurprising that donor
states would seek means of coordinating their efforts. As a result, several new organizations
developed and several existing organizations developed new responsibilities. For example, the
Global Fund was launched in 2002 as a means of raising and distributing money contributed
by member states.
The recent increases in DAH from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) attributed
to both the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals, as well as increased disease
threats. Three of the Millennium Development Goals, adopted in September of 2000, deal
specifically with issues of health. Goals 4 through 6 require reduction in childhood mortality,
improvement to women’s health, and combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major dis-
eases respectively. These goals not only identify key health problems in developing countries,
but identify poor health is a barrier to development. The connection of poor health to dis-
heartening economic performance and other related negative outcomes has had a substantial
impact on DAH allocations from development banks. The World Bank Group, for example
has played an increasingly important role in health assistance since the 1990’s. Although
the World Bank originally offered few funds for health projects, by 1995 it had expanded
its activities in the health sector so dramatically that it is now the largest funder of health,
nutrition and population programs in low and middle income states, giving a total of 13.5
billion dollars in 2002 (Buse & Gwin 1998, Alberinni et al. 2005). World Bank contributions
include billions of dollars to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Regional develop-
ment banks have followed suit — becoming a major source of assistance for health related
projects. Over the past four decades, the Inter-American and the African Development
Banks have provided 291 and 19.8 billion dollars respectively of assistance for health related
3The total increase in aid from international organizations, and multilateral donors in general, is difficult
to measure. Changes in reporting procedures and classifications of health related result in gross over-
estimation of most estimates.
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project. Similarly, in 2003 alone, the Asian Development Bank dispersed 3.8 billion dollars
in health related development aid (Zacher & Keefe 2008).
In addition, the MDGs, specifically goals 4 through 6, represent global consensus re-
garding the importance of health. As with most international conventions, the Millennium
Development Goals are the culmination of a long process of diplomacy and international
negotiations among all members of the United Nations. Agreement upon these goals has
outlined shared international values and aspirations. As a result, bilateral and multilateral
donors alike have altered their aid policies to reflect those aspirations.
Beyond the adoptions of the Millennium Development Goals, increased health coopera-
tion can also be attributed to shared concern about new and reemergent threats to global
health. The discovery and rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, as well as outbreaks of Ebola in the
1980’s and 90’s alarmed domestic and international health officials equally. The SARS pan-
demic in 2002-2003 and growing global concern over the potential for an avian flu pandemic
has only heightened this concern. As described previously, failure of one country to control
these outbreaks could produce devastating externalities for many other states. Thus, many
countries have increasingly looked for ways to coordinate on health concerns and alleviate
the threat of disease. International organizations have become a key forum through which
states work to coordinate health policy, improve developing state health systems, and pre-
vent the spread of disease. For example, the Global Fund and the emergence of global health
partnerships have brought together bilateral donors and intergovernmental organizations to
pool resources and identify shared goals, as well as develop and fund global health initiatives.
These organizations distribute DAH to recipients around the globe and address a wide
array of issues including both general health concerns and disease specific programs. For
example, the United Nations and its affiliated agencies are among the most active multi-
lateral participants with regard to health and address a wide variety of health issues. The
World Health Organization’s primary objective is the design of effective health policy. The
WHO engages in surveillance, data collection, reporting, research, and provision of technical
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and policy advise. Indeed, approximately half of its budget is used to fund technical assis-
tance efforts to combat disease (Siddiqi 1995). The United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF), and the United Nations Popula-
tion Fund (UNFPA) all provide aid for various health related objectives including improved
nutrition, maternal and child health, testing and treatment for sexually-transmitted infec-
tions, and vaccination programs. In 2001, 24 percent of UNICEF’s budget was allocated for
immunization and 7 percent for HIV/AIDS projects (UNICEF 2001, Zacher & Keefe 2008).
Unlike bilateral donors, these organizations represent the interests and values of a col-
lection of states. As a result, their incentives in providing development aid for health differ
considerably from those of bilateral donors. Unlike bilateral donor governments, intergov-
ernmental organizations do not answer to constituencies through elections. Instead, in-
tergovernmental organizations act as agents of governments that have reached a decision
about issues of mutual concern.4 While some international organizations have health spe-
cific objectives, such as the Global Fund, others operate under much broader mandates. For
example, the World Bank’s primary objective is to provide loans and grants to developing
countries with the express purpose of improving development. Connecting poor health to
a collection of negative outcomes regarding economic development has resulted in a signifi-
cant change in how the World Bank approaches health in developing states. Prior to 1980
the World Bank, provided very limited support for health initiatives. However, research
has emerged connecting diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis in particular, to de-
pressed economic performance. In 2001, the Commission on Macroeconomic and Health
reported that each 10 percent improvement in life expectancy at birth is associated with an
increase in economic growth of at least 0.3 percentage points per year when other growth
factors are held constant (Millennium Development Goals Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health 2001, Shiffman 2006), while Bloom and Williamson (Bloom & Williamson 1998)
4Although there is some support for the argument that international organizations are subject to polit-
ical influences, others argue that multilateral donors are free of strategic interests and thus more efficient
distributors of development aid (Girod 2008, Heady 2008, Kilby & Dreher 2010).
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estimate the roughly one third of the “East Asian Miracle” may be attributable to improve-
ments in health. By tying poor health to poor economic outcomes, the World Bank is able
to fund health initiatives that support its mandate and reflect the shared objectives of its
members — improved development.
Although the World Bank and other international organizations do rely on contributions
from member states, they remain separate from individual governments. Although member
states may disagree over the specifics of policies, accountability to localized constituencies
is generally non-existent. As a result, international organizations are generally freed of the
policy constraints imposed upon bilateral donors. This means, using the World Bank exam-
ple above, that the combination of a broad mandate and a global constituency enables the
World Bank to fund programs to control malaria, schistosomiasis and other diseases that
affect development without concern for the distribution of benefits outside of the recipient
country. Likewise, because decisions made by IGOs cannot be attributed to a single gov-
ernment, governments may be more willing to support humanitarian/need-based initiatives
even in the absence of benefits to their domestic audiences. As a result, one would expect
multilateral donors to be more responsive to the global burden of disease and recipient need
— selecting diseases with higher global and recipient burden of disease. Thus, I proposed to
the following propositions:
Proposition 4: Disease burden will significantly impact DAH allocations from multilateral
donors.
Proposition 5: Recipient disease burden will significantly impact DAH allocations from
multilateral donors.
If multilateral donors are freed from the necessity of appeasing localized constituencies,
different criteria may be used in the selection of diseases and disease control activities to
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support. Likewise, if the theory outlined in the previous paragraph is true, and multilateral
donors are more responsive to humanitarian concerns, it is likely that aid will be allocated in
a manner so as to increase cost-effectiveness in order to provide the greatest relief possible.
Indeed, the World Bank incorporates cost-effectiveness in its evaluation of health policies
and outcomes. Its 1993 World Development Report and background studies were among
the first attempts to use cost-effectiveness analysis. Using Disability Adjusted Life Year
(DALY), this report presented global priority-setting exercises which were then translated
into recommendations about specific public health objectives for low and middle income
countries (World Bank 1993).
Each disease has a variety of prevention and treatment options, each with a separate
financial cost. For example, measles can be prevented with a vaccination while cholera can
be prevented through improved sanitation, proper water treatment, and the digging of deep
source wells. Each of these interventions has a different cost, as do different treatment options
for various diseases. Multilateral donors may use cost-effectiveness analyses to calculate the
benefit produced through spending on specific diseases and activities. These calculations
could then be used to produce the greatest improvement to health for the money or “more
health bang for their buck.” Thus, I propose the following proposition:
Proposition 6: The cost of treatment and prevention will significantly impact DAH allo-
cations from multilateral donors.
Other Donors
In addition to bilateral and multilateral donors, a collection of non-governmental entities have
also become key contributors of development aid for health, including non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), philanthropic organizations, and private businesses. These donors
are dramatically different from bilateral and multilateral donors with regard to objectives,
resources, and constraints. Moreover, these donors vary substantially within their own cat-
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egory — private businesses’ objective are considerably different than those of NGOs and
philanthropic foundations. Although these donors will not be addressed in the empirical
chapters, the category serves as a useful comparison to bilateral and multilateral donors.
Philanthropic Foundations Philanthropic foundations have been a staple in health assistance
for nearly a century. The Rockefeller Foundation, established in 1913, was essential in early
health coordination efforts. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation provided nearly half
of the League of Nations Health Organization’s budget (Weindling 1995). In addition, the
Rockefeller Foundation been active in disease control and research. Its early agenda focused
upon the control of malaria, hookworm, and yellow fever in the southern United States and
parts of Latin America, and in 1935 the first vaccine for yellow fever was developed in the
Rocekfeller Laboratory (Weindling 1995, Berridge & Herring 2009).
Other prominent foundations have also contributed to provision of DAH. The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation (Gate Foundation), for example provides large amounts of funding
for vaccine development and treatment for neglected diseases. Indeed, the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation supplies more than 17 percent of all funding currently directed toward
the eradication of polio. Having provided more than $13 billion to global health in the last
seven years, it is one of the largest donors - rivaling states and international organizations
in terms of contributions(Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2010).
Unlike governmental donors and other civil society donors, philanthropic foundations’
budgets are maintained through investment rather than contribution. For example, The
Gate Foundation was originally founded with a 94 million dollar stock gift in 1994. In 2000,
Bill Gates added an additional 126 million dollar gift. In 2006, Warren Buffett pledged the
foundation 10 million shares of Berkshire Hathaway shares spread over multiple years. The
donation totaled approximately 30 billion dollars. These funds are managed through the Bill
and Melinda Gates Trust, which manages these investments and the transfer of interest from
these investments to chosen initiatives(Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2010). Because
philanthropic foundations are not accountable to any particular constituency — including
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contributors — they are free to select initiatives based upon their own criteria. Thus any
systematic predictions about the priorities of foundations as a category is impossible.
Non-Governmental Organizations Non-governmental organizations for health include uni-
versities, research organizations, professional associations and trade unions, faith based or-
ganizations, and consumer groups. NGOs differ considerably in organization, funding and
mission. Some, such as Oxfam and International Planned Parenthood, are well funded, in-
ternationally recognized and administer a wide range of health related interventions, while
others remain relatively small with few resources. (Buse & Walt 2002).
These organizations also focus on a variety of activities including fund raising, lobbying
and carrying out health initiatives in developing countries. For example, Medecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF) is a trade based organization, focusing on organizing health interventions
in and deploying individuals with medical expertise to developing countries. It maintains
missions in roughly 80 developing countries and its activities range from providing medical
treatment in refugee camps and/or during times of conflict to maintaining clinics in under-
serviced areas. In 1999 it established one of the most successful campaigns to provide access
to essential medicines for neglected tropical diseases (Buse & Walt 2002, Medecins Sans
Frontieres 2009).
Because NGOs vary considerably generalization and comparison is often difficult, as is
identifying factors the influence DAH decisions. NGOs are do not faced specific constituency
pressures like those exerted upon states. As a result, DAH provided by NGOs is likely to more
accurately match each NGOs respective mission. For example, the Carter Center, which was
founded by former president and first lady Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter, has a stated mission
of advancing human rights and alleviating suffering — specifically, the center focuses upon
health concerns neglected by other international donors (The Carter Center 2003). To this
end it directs 77.5 percent of its funding is toward health programs, many of which focus
specifically upon combating tropical infectious diseases with initiatives directed specifically
at guinea worm, onchocerciasis, trachoma, and schistosomiasis (The Carter Center 2003).
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Private Businesses Finally, private businesses are another notable non-governmental donor.
Private businesses, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector, have increasingly begun pro-
viding development aid for health. In 1998, 10 major drug companies created the Partnership
for Quality Medical Donations. Since that time, these companies have donated nearly 2.7
billion dollars worth of medical products directed at a variety of diseases including lym-
phatic filariasis, malaria, and TB (Hotez 2008). Other notable contributions include a 122
million dollar donation by Novartis to establish a tropical disease research center in Singa-
pore (Zacher & Keefe 2008). Unlike other entities, private businesses have privately funded
initiatives whose funds are directly linked to the provision of other health materials. The
motivation for private businesses to provide DAH is directly related to business outcomes.
Maintaining a positive business image is helped significantly by charitable activities. How-
ever, in order for this incentive to play out, the diseases addressed must be high profile
enough to gain public recognition. The highest profile diseases will be those that are most
likely to affect population in industrialized societies.
2.2.4 Donor Coordination
The allocations of development aid for health will reflect, not only divergent donor interests
across diseases and activities, but may also reflect the affect of shared ideas and norms. Con-
structivists argue that the diffusion of ideas may influence actors’ preferences and behaviors,
resulting in similar policy outcomes (Finnemore 1996, Deacon 1997, Keck & Sikkink 1998).
The international health complex, including bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental
donors as well as recipients, has increasingly emphasized the sharing of information and
provision of recommendations and technical support. In addition, the development of global
health partnerships, such as those among the WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF, and the World
Bank, indicate a growing effort to identify shared goals and coordinate efforts — at least at
the multilateral level. These activities might be viewed as having a socializing affect. This
socialization may affect the allocation of development aid for health. If donors develop a
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shared agenda — such as the proposed “global public health agenda” — the allocation of
DAH will reflect areas of agreement and shared values at the expense of areas where there
has been no such socialization. Shared ideas, preferences, and/or agendas may develop as a
result of international cooperation, or through a degree of policy leadership. Global partner-
ships, like those developed among the UN agencies and the World Bank, may play a crucial
role in identifying diseases to target and devising policy programs.
One way to identify areas of shared values is to identify diseases that have been targeted
by a disease specific international control program, such as the Eradicate Polio program.
These programs indicate diseases that are recognized by multiple donors as deserving specific
attention and provide policy recommendations. The result of this socialization process will be
policy convergence around these programs, with donors providing more money for targeted
diseases. Thus, I propose the following proposition:
Proposition 7: A disease being targeted by a disease specific international control program
will significantly impact DAH allocations.
2.3 Disease Control Activities and Donor Priorities
The public and club good principles described above distinguish DAH from the models of
other types of foreign aid. While the preceding discussion contends that donor interests may
vary across diseases, it is also possible for interests to vary across disease control activity.
For each disease, donors and recipients devise a program that employs a combination of
activities such as prevention, education, treatment, and research to achieve program goals.
These activities are directed at various aspects of disease spread and produce benefits that
are relatively more or less public in nature. I extend the theory presented above, which uses
the allocation of aid across diseases to explain donor priorities, to the selection of disease
control activity.
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Efforts to control diseases take many forms. For examples, in an effort to control tu-
berculosis donors may provide aid for increased TB screening, surveillance and monitoring,
provision of directly observed treatment, short-course (DOTS) to infected individuals, the
building of clinics to increase access to testing and treatment in developing countries, and/or
research into effective treatment for anti-microbial resistant tuberculosis, among other pos-
sible activities. These activities fall into eight primary categories: prevention, treatment,
infrastructure, administrative assistance, research, surveillance and outbreak responsiveness,
education, and general program support. The benefits of these activities cover a continuum
of public-ness. For example, investment in infrastructure, such as the building a hospital
in a developing country, provides direct benefits to individuals in that community. Those
benefits, however, are limited to individuals in that community — excludable based upon
distance from hospital. The good produced by investment in infrastructure more closely
resembles a club good and has only a low degree of public-ness. Likewise, the benefits of
treatment for HIV/AIDS are primarily private. Although the treatment produces significant
benefits for the individual, these benefits are not shared by others in society.5 In contrast,
testing, reporting, monitoring and surveillance of disease incidence provides information
that is accessible and useful to all members of the international system. Table 2.3 displays
these eight categories of disease control activities, provides examples of each and rates the
publicness of the benefits produced as being high, moderate, or low in publicness.
If disease specific DAH is the result of goals and technical solutions agreed upon by
all actors, it is reasonable to expect that programs across similar diseases should employ
similar activities. For example, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and influenza are all transmitted
from one individual to another, may remain undiagnosed for a period of time during which
5Recent research indicates that although the benefits of treatment for HIV/AIDS is primarily private,
it does produce some benefits that are shared by others. Access to anti-retroviral treatments encourages
individuals to get tested for HIV/AIDS and encourages responsible behavior in confirmed cases of HIV
positive individuals (Pisani 2009). Likewise, anti-retroviral medications have been shown to reduce the virus
load in infected individuals, decreasing the likelihood of infected and uninfected individual who might come
into contact with infected bodily fluids (?)
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the individual may pass the disease to others, and spread across state borders with relative
ease. In contrast, malaria, schistosomiasis, and guinea worm cannot be transmitted directly
from one individual to another. Nor is there a credible threat of global spread. Given these
similarities, one would expect programs for the first group of diseases to be similar to one
another but differ from the latter group. If, however, donors’ allocate aid in a manner in-
tended to maximize their enjoyment of the benefits — as described in the previous section
— it is also likely that donors are strategic in their allocations by activity. In particular, one
would expect donors to select activities that global benefits, such as surveillance and moni-
toring, over activities with localized benefits, such as treatment. This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 8: DAH allocations will be more likely to be directed at activities with public
rather than private benefits.
2.4 Studying Development Assistance for Health
The 8 propositions produced here serve as the foundation for the rest of the project. Using
these propositions, I develop several statistical models of DAH allocations that account
for recipient need and donor interest. Although the models reflect the initial theories of
development aid allocations, they also reflect a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics
of development aid for health. The dataset used to test these hypotheses is structured in
a manner that enables me to examine specific donor, recipient and disease variables. For
example, variables measuring donor interest account for variations in disease prevalence and
geographic spread, as well as prevention and treatment costs. The following analyses reveal
the political nature of DAH allocations, illuminate the political forces at work, and offer
explanation for disparities between disease specific DAH and disease burden.
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Aid Allocations
Level of Explanation Variable Example
Recipient Need
GDP per Capita Svensson 1999
Caloric Intake Schraeder et al 1998
Life Expectancy Schraeder et al 1998
Donor Interests
Bilateral aid flows Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985
Exports Apodaca and Stohl
Colonial legacy Alesina and Dollar
UN voting similarity Alesina and Dollar 2000
Arms Transfers Maizels and Nissanke 1984
Military personnel Apodaca and Stohl 1999
Good Governance
Civil and Political Rights Svensson 1999
Personal Integrity Rights Neumayer 2003
Political Stability and democracy McKinlay and Little 1977
Trade Openness Alesina and Dollar 2000
Rule of law Alesina and Dollar
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Table 2.3: The publicness of disease control activities
Category Activities Public-ness
Prevention Immunization, Preventive Measures, etc. Moderate
Treatment Anti-retroviral Therapy, Antibiotics, etc. Low
Infrastructure Clinics, Hospitals, etc. Low
Administrative Assistance Advisors, Personnel, etc. Moderate
Research Data Collection, Clinical Trial, etc. Moderate
Surveillance Monitoring, Reporting, etc. High
Education Dissemination of information, Behavior modification Moderate
General/Access Health system support, etc. Moderate
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Chapter 3
Donor Priorities Across Diseases
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I address the relationship between disease characteristics and donors’ allo-
cations of disease specific health aid. The theory proposed here suggests that international
donors have incentives to invest disease specific aid strategically in order to maximize their
enjoyment of the resulting benefits. Donors are able to maximize their benefits by select-
ing diseases that are most likely to affect their constituent population. Specifically, the
theory predicts that donors will provide higher levels of aid for diseases with greater geo-
graphic spread. However, because there is considerable variation in constituent populations
across donors, I also expect differences in funding priorities between bilateral and multilat-
eral donors. This chapter uses differences across diseases to examine donor priorities, as
measured by level of disease specific development aid for health.
In the following section, I outline expectations and develop testable hypotheses. In the
second section I describe the data and research methods used to address these hypotheses. I
then examine bilateral and multilateral donors’ disease specific aid allocations using several
multilevel linear regressions and report the findings addressing these hypotheses.
3.2 Disease Characteristics and Donor Priorities
The literature on foreign aid establishes donors may allocate aid based on a combination
recipient need and donor interest. For this study, donor interest can mean economic, political
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and/or health interests. I assume that donors of development aid for health (DAH) hold
some minimal level of interest in improving health, either globally or within a recipient
country. In the previous chapter, I argue that the public nature of the of disease control
provides incentives for donors to invest their resources strategically in order to maximize
their enjoyment of any benefits. In order to test this theory, I must first identify a pattern
of allocations that serve donors interests while neglecting the potential for a collectively
better or more efficient outcome. In this chapter, I use disease characteristics to parse out
differences in donor priorities.
Diseases provide a particularly useful tool for identifying distortions in aid allocations.
Variation across several disease characteristics provides ample means of identifying recipient
need and various donor priorities, as well as examining differences between need/efficiency
and donor allocations. Specifically, I use differences in disease geography and burden. Dis-
eases vary considerably in terms of geographic spread. Some diseases such at tuberculosis
are transmitted through casual contact and may spread quite easily across borders without
any limitation. Other diseases, such as schistosomiasis — which relies upon an intermediary
host that can only survive in tropical climates — are geographically limited. In addition to
the geographic limitations of disease, disease burden varies substantially across diseases and
across states. Disease burden is the relative weight or cost, in terms of loss of human life,
associated with a disease. Disease may vary as a result of not only geographic limitations,
but also of the prevalence of the disease, the morbidity and mortality rate of the disease,
the population it generally affects (e.g. the aged, infants and children, etc.), and the general
state of health within a given country. Disease burden will vary across diseases — e.g. the
burden of measles in Uganda will differ from the burden of HIV/AIDS in Uganda — and a
single disease’s burden will vary across countries. For example, diseases such as cholera, that
are relatively rare and easily treated in developed states, can be devastating in developing
states where poor sanitation and water systems and few health resources result in greater
spread and higher mortality.
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Variation across diseases’ burdens and geographic spread may be used to parse out donor
interests. As the previous chapter explains, disease control can be addressed as a semi-
public good. Although control of infectious diseases is non-rival, the distribution of benefits
associated with improvements to disease control are indirectly excludable. Because poor
health is centralized in developing states, improvements to health due to foreign aid and will
also be centralized in developing states. As a result, donors may have incentive to invest
strategically to maximize their enjoyment of the benefits resulting from improved disease
control. If disease specific aid allocations are strategic and based upon donor interests, donors
may attempt to focus on diseases with geographic ranges that include their constituency.
Likewise, they may also focus on diseases for which there is evidence of the potential to
threaten their constituency (e.g. higher disease burden).
In addition to identifying donor interests, burden of disease is also a useful and objec-
tive tool for identifying global and recipient need. Because disease burden will vary across
diseases, between recipients, as well as across donors and recipients, it is possible to iden-
tify diseases that cause the most human suffering and death globally and within a recipient
state. If donors allocate disease specific aid in an effort to save the most lives or relieve
the most suffering, diseases with higher burdens should presumably receive higher levels
of funding. However, if donors allocate disease specific aid strategically to maximize their
benefits, diseases with high burdens may be neglected.
In addition to geography and burden, diseases also provide useful economic variation.
Differences in prevention and treatment costs across various diseases allow for distinction
between need, efficiency, and interest. Prevention for various diseases runs from immuniza-
tion programs and provision of insecticide treated bed-nets, which cost a few dollars, to
improvements to sanitation systems and marsh drainage which cost hundreds of thousands
or millions of dollars. Likewise, treatment for various diseases runs from a short course
of antibiotics to years of anti-retrovirus treatment. Variation in prevention and treatment
across diseases allows for the separation of need and efficiency and the inclusion of economic
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calculations. For example, donors seeking to maximize lives saved and suffering alleviated
may choose to invest in diseases with lower costs of prevention and treatment to get “more
bang for their buck.” In contrast, donors seeking to address specific disease threats may
disregard the cost of prevention and treatment.
3.2.1 Donor Interests
Donors efforts to identify disease threats will be affected, in part, by the nature of the donor
and its constituency. Different types of donors represent different constituencies and thus will
have differing efforts. Bilateral donors have a localized constituency — the citizens within
the state’s borders. Thus, if bilateral donors are investing DAH strategically, they may have
very limited interests and only invest in diseases that will affect a localized population. In
contrast, multilateral donors represent a global or regional constituency. Because multilateral
donors’ constituencies may cover several or many states and are less localized, they are likely
to have broader interests and a wider portfolio of diseases that threaten their populations.
Bilateral Donors
Disease geography and burden provide useful tools for identifying diseases that threaten
donor audiences. Bilateral donors may provide development aid for health as a means of
reducing the threat of disease to their constituency. Indeed, these donors may decide that it
is more cost effective to prevent and treat an outbreak while it remains contained in another
country, than to pay the expenses associated with an outbreak or epidemic among their local
population. Specifically, bilateral donors will focus upon diseases with fewer geographic
limitations and that have demonstrated potential for infecting the donor’s constituency
(resulting in higher burdens) potentially at the expense of diseases with higher burdens
in the recipient state and globally.
Additionally, the localized nature of bilateral donors constituencies may also distort
donors’ decisions regarding the cost-effectiveness of addressing one disease over another.
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All donors have an interest in preventing the spread of disease. Indeed, it is less costly to
prevent or contain an outbreak elsewhere than to treat a epidemic at home. Bilateral donors,
however, may have modified interests. Some diseases are easily and/or cheaply treated in
developed states while others remain quite expensive. Because bilateral donors are primarily
concerned with the localized population, they have incentive to focus — and presumably
reduce the threat — of diseases with the highest treatment cost. This is in contrast to the
cost-effectiveness or “more bang for the buck” expectation. Likewise, diseases that are easily
prevented in developed states through extensive vaccination programs will be of less threat
to the localized population. As a result bilateral donors may spend less on these diseases.
Thus, I consider the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Disease specific aid from bilateral donors will be positively correlated
with that disease’s burden within the donor country.
Hypothesis 2: Disease specific aid from bilateral donors will be negatively correlated
with that disease’s geographic limitations. (E.g. Less geographically limited diseases will
received higher levels of funding).
Hypothesis 3: Disease specific aid from bilateral donors will be positively correlated
with the cost of averting a single DALY.
Hypothesis 4: Disease specific aid from bilateral donors will be negatively correlated
with diseases with established and effective vaccination strategies.
Multilateral Donors
In contrast to bilateral donors, multilateral donors represent a wider constituency that is less
localized and may be subject to a wider range of diseases. Organizations such as the United
Nations and the World Bank, which represent global interests, cannot limit their interests
to diseases that threaten only a localized population. Likewise, organizations such as the
Organization of American States and the African Development Bank represent audiences
and interests of multiple states. Although these interests are more localized than those of
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global organizations, they cannot be limited to only diseases that threaten the population of
a particular state. As a result, multilateral donors will be more responsive to diseases with
globally — or regionally, depending upon the organization — threat.
Additionally, the expanded constituency of multilateral donors will likely increase their
adherence to cost-effective strategies. Unlike bilateral donors, which have incentives to pay
high treatment costs in order to minimize the threat of diseases to a localized population,
multilateral donors have incentives to focus on saving the most lives. As a result, they will
likely focus on diseases with lower prevention and treatment costs to ensure they do the
most good with their money. Immunization programs provide some of the best “bang for
the buck”. Thus, I consider the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: Disease specific aid from multilateral donors will be positively correlated
with that disease’s global burden.
Hypothesis 6: Disease specific aid from multilateral donors will be negatively correlated
with that disease’s geographic limitations.
Hypothesis 7: Disease specific aid from multilateral donors will be negatively correlated
with the cost of averting a single DALY.
Hypothesis 8: Disease specific aid from multilateral donors will be positively correlated
with diseases with established and effective vaccination strategies.
Misallocation of Aid
Finally, while the hypotheses established above identify concrete expectations from the the-
ory, they do not address whether this reflects a misallocation in aid or not. Implicit in these
discussions is the expectation that providing disease specific aid based on donors’ interests
regarding geographic spread, burden and cost, produces results that maximize the benefits
of donors at the expense of recipients, as well as the global collective good. Consider the fol-
lowing counter-factual — if disease control were a pure public good in which the benefits of
reducing infection rates for any disease would be share equally by all members of the system,
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donors would have incentive to spend money on diseases that affect the most people and
are the least costly to treat and prevent. Thus, donors would provide more foreign aid for
diseases with the highest burden globally and/or within a given recipient state. In contrast
to this, the theory suggests that if donors are giving based upon their interests, the burden of
disease in recipient states should be insignificant. Although the previous hypotheses provide
some expectations of donor interests, they fail to address the potential misallocation.
Moreover, the theory only implies a relative lack of importance of recipient and global
need. In some circumstances, donors’ interests may match recipient and global need however,
it is assumed that these factors are less influential than other measures of donor interest.
Thus, I include an additional hypothesis.
Hypothesis 9: Disease specific aid will be positively correlated with the burden of that
disease within the recipient country.
Finding support for this hypothesis will not provide conclusive evidence that recipient need
matters. However, finding evidence or a negative relationship between aid allocations and
recipient need would support the theory’s expectation of recipient need being relatively less
important.
3.3 Data and Research Design
The primary argument of the theory suggests that (1) donors’ invest disease specific aid
strategically to gain the greatest benefit from improvements to disease control — specif-
ically, to decrease the threat of disease to their constituencies, and (2) that differences in
constituencies between bilateral and multilateral donors lead to differences in disease specific
aid allocations. In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, I use a com-
bination of interviews with policy-makers, descriptive data, and systematic analyses. I began
by identifying donors, recipients, and relevant diseases. Although the number of bilateral
donors for development aid for health has grown drastically over the last two decades, the
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22 members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continue to provide
the vast majority of DAH funds. As a result, I use allocations from these members to test
bilateral donor priorities. In addition to these, I also include DAH allocations from 20 multi-
lateral organizations including global organizations such as the World Bank and the United
Nations, as well as regional organizations such as the Organization of American States.
I included 150 potential recipients of disease specific aid from these donors. I limited
potential recipients to those qualifying for OECD development aid and for whom the World
Health Organization and the Global Burden of Disease Project maintain disease specific
data. Finally, I identified 25 diseases that vary in terms of mode of transmission, geographic
spread, cost of prevention and treatment, and global burden of disease. Although there
are many disease to choose from, I selected diseases that currently, and have historically,
account for large numbers of infections and death within developing states and whose burden
of disease is calculated by the Global Burden of Disease Project. Thus, my unit of analysis
is donor/recipient/disease triad. I begin with a population of all combinations of potential
donors, diseases and recipients totaling 161,250. A list of donors, recipients and diseases can
be found in Appendix 1.
The dependent variable for each of these hypotheses is disease specific development aid.
In order to calculate disease specific aid, I use health specific aid data generated from the
Project Level Aid database (Findley, Hawkins, Hicks, Nielson, Parks, Powers, Roberts,
Tierney, & Wilson 2010). A search of the Project Level database for health specific aid
produced approximately 60,000 health oriented grants between the years of 1995 and 2008.
From these I identified 15,018 grants that directly targeted specific diseases.
The information about each grant varied dramatically. Some grants included detailed
information regarding the disease, the programs, and the intent of the grant. For example,
below is a description of grant from Norway to Guatemala. It provides description of not only
the disease of focus and the program objective, but also the motivation behind the objective:
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“The goal of the program is to improve the quality of life for of those with HIV/AIDS in
Latin America. The program is intended to raise social awareness and minimize the social
and economic impacts of HIV/AIDS at the individual level. Specifically, to sensitize society
and the catholic church, denouncing the marginalization of people infected on HIV/AIDS
and new forms of suffering and illness.”
In contrast, only minimal information was provided for some other grants. For example,
below is the description of a grant from Germany to Uganda and identifies the diseases and
the program strategy”
“HIV/AIDS, STD testing in rural communities.”
In many cases, a single grant targeted more than one disease — as in the example above.
Although some grants did specify what portion of the grant each disease would receive, most
did not. Thus, for grants that did not specify the breakdown of the money across multiple
diseases, I duplicated the grant for each of the diseases addressed.
Using these grants, I coded donor, recipient, disease, and the program strategy if it was
described — the program strategy data will be used in the next chapter. For example, below
is the description of grant from Canada to Vietnam from 2007:
“Avian Flu - Pandemic Influenza This grant will support the implementation of spe-
cific areas of Vietnams Strategic Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza and will significantly
improve alert and response to epidemic-prone diseases and the implementation of the In-
ternational Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). Of the objectives within Vietnams Strategic
Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza, this proposal will seek to address: 1. Intensify Rapid
Containment operations (Strategic Objective 3); 2. Building Capacity for SAP implemen-
tation; 3. Improving surveillance and reporting”
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Based upon this text, I coded the following line of data, where 104 is Canada’s donor
code, 663 is Vietnam’s recipient code, 105 is the disease code for pandemic influenza, and 9
is the program code for Outbreak/Responsiveness:
Year Donor Recipient Disease Program/Strategy Commitment
2007 104 663 105 9 3139760
I then aggregated grants with the same donor—recipient—disease combinations across
time, producing the total aid allocated for each disease to each recipient from each donor.
However, these grants represent only the cases in which aid was given. Each donor had
the opportunity to give aid to 150 recipients for 25 different disease, yet most did only
provided aid in a fraction of those cases. These cases of no aid are equally important to
understanding how and why donors allocate aid. Thus, I generated a dataset that included
all possible donor/recipient/disease combinations and input the aggregate funding in cases
where aid was given, coding the rest of the cases as zeros for the dependent variable.
3.3.1 Independent Variables
The hypotheses established in the previous section address the relationship between various
disease characteristics and the resulting level of aid allocation. Thus, it is necessary to
account for disease burden, cost, and geographic spread of various diseases. In addition,
these hypotheses address various levels of analysis including aggregate disease funding by
bilateral and multilateral donors, and disease specific aid by individual donors. As a result,
I include data for each of these various levels
Disease Burden: The primary variable of interest in this analysis is the burden of dis-
ease measured as thousands of Disability-Adjusted Life Years or DALYs. The most obvious
negative effects of disease are the premature loss of life and the development of disabilities.
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Disability-Adjusted Life Years combine the number of years of life lost due to premature
death — using a state’s average life expectancy — with the number of years lived with a
disability. Thus, a DALY is a single year of life lost due to death or disability as a result
of a single cause. For example, if a three-year-old child in Uganda, where the average life
expectancy is 53 years (UNICEF 2009), this death would be recorded as measles causing
50 disability-adjusted life years within Uganda. In this way, DALYs can be thought of as a
“bad” that should be minimized.
Disease burden varies across both states and diseases. Disability-Adjusted Life Years
accounts for these variations in disease burden. DALYs resulting from measles within Uganda
will differ from DALYs resulting from leprosy in Uganda, which will differ from DALYs
resulting from either measles or leprosy in Australia. The level of threat posed by a specific
disease will vary significantly across donors and recipients. Thus, for bilateral donors, I
include the disability-adjusted life years of the specific disease for both the donor and the
recipient. Because multilateral donors represent a wider population, I substitute either the
global or regional disability-adjusted life years for the donor burden of a specific disease.
Disease Cost: In addition to disease burden, donors may also consider the cost of
preventing and/or treating a particular disease. In considering the cost a disease, one must
consider the broad range of strategies. For example, DALYs as a result of HIV/AIDS
can be averted in several ways, each with a different cost, including: through screening of
blood transfusions, provision of sterile needles to injection drug users, the use of condoms,
Mother-Child-Transmission inhibiting medications and treatment with anti-retroviral drugs.
While the cost of condoms to prevent infection is relatively low, the cost of anti-retroviral
treatment is quite high. The cost of prevention and treatment also varies considerably across
diseases. For example, vaccination for pertussis (whooping cough), which remains prevalent,
costs only a few dollars and not only prevents infection for the individual, but also provides
added protection for many others. Similarly, the cost of a filter straw, used to prevent the
ingestion of copepods (water fleas) that result in Guinea Worm infections cost less than
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a dollar. In contrast, prevention strategies for diarrhoeal diseases include water sanitation
systems, costing potentially millions of dollars.
In order to measure the cost a disease I use Jamison et al (2005)’s estimated average
cost of averting a single disability-adjusted life year, measured in constant US dollars, for
each disease. This measure combines both disease prevention and treatment — averaging
the costs of both.
Immunization: The development of vaccination programs changed modern medicine
dramatically. Through immunization, diseases that once wreaked havoc across the globe are
now controlled, eliminated or, in one case, eradicated. The eradication of smallpox and the
control of measles and polio as a result of vaccination programs have saved millions of lives.
Immunization programs represent the most public of strategies in disease control. The low
cost of a single vaccination and the aggregation of health benefits to populations with high
vaccination rates make immunization one of the most cost effective strategies. Likewise, well
developed immunization programs have virtually eliminated diseases such polio and measles
in developed countries. As a result, the availability and implementation of immunization
programs provides two incentives — donors may choose to provide more funding for im-
munizable diseases as a promising strategy for disease control or donors may choose not to
provide funding for immunizable diseases because their local populations are protected by
domestic immunizations. To measure immunization I use a dichotomous indicator where 1
indicates diseases for which vaccination programs are established and 0 for those that are
not. 1
Geographic Spread: Finally, the threat posed by a disease varies depending upon
distance to which it can spread. Because some diseases, such as schistosomiasis, are geo-
graphically limited, they pose less of a threat to some states — donor states in particular.
1Immunization may be correlated with cost-effectiveness thereby splitting variance between diseases with
low cost per DALY averted and immunization. The pairwise correlation between the two variables is quite
low — .08. Yet, to address this concern, I also ran models that excluded the immunization variable and the
result for cost per DALY averted maintained the same sign and in/significance.
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Thus, I include a dichotomous variable for geographic limitations — a 1 indicating a geo-
graphically limited disease and a 0 indicating diseases without geographic limitations that
spread easily across borders.
3.3.2 Control Variables
In order to account for potentially confounding factors, I include several control variables.
The first is GDP per capita. Low income countries generally have poorer infrastructure and
fewer programs already in place. As a result, donors may be inclined to provide more funding
to less developed states. GDP per capita, along with life expectancy and caloric intake, is
a common measure of recipient financial need within the foreign aid literature. In this
study it is the most appropriate of these potential measures because, while a country’s low
income will certainly have an effect upon overall health, this effect is indirect. The other two
measures are directly related to health and are more highly correlated with recipient burden
of disease, one of the key independent variables. For example, caloric intake has a direct
effect on health as individuals suffering from poor nutrition are more susceptible to infections.
Likewise, a recipient’s burden of disease is directly related to morbidity and mortality rates
and calculations of life expectancy. Thus, I use the recipient’s average GDP per capita
reported in constant 2000 US dollars. Likewise, because programs within high population
recipient states must serve more people, it is likely that donors provide greater funds based
upon population. Thus, I use a recipients population in 2001, measured in thousands of
people, as a control for the size of the recipient. Both of these variables were collected using
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2011).
Additionally, diseases that have been targeted for attention by international programs
may receive higher levels of funding. For example, the global campaign to eradicate polio
virus has decreased infection rates drastically. In fact, polio remains endemic in only a
handful of countries — Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Congo, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan (World Health Organization 2010a). Even within these
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countries, infections are rare — ranging from 1 to 25 cases each year. Yet, despite its
low burden of disease, polio may receive greater quantities of disease specific aid as has
been identified for eradication. Similar examples include the Eradicate Measles campaign
as well as the Rollback Malaria campaign. Thus, I include a dichotomous indicator for
diseases that are currently the target of an international program to address the disease,
using a 1 to indicate targeted diseases and a 0 to indicate non-targeted diseases. It is
important to note that not all such campaigns focus on eradication. For example, because
gorillas serve as a reservoir population for malaria, it is impossible to fully eradicate malaria
(Prugnolle & Renaud 2010). However, this has not prevented a global campaign to decrease
its transmission and improve access to treatment within developing countries.
I also include a control variable for colonial legacy. Alesina and Dollar (2000) show that
political alliances and colonial legacy are significant predictors of foreign aid allocations.
Development aid for health is no exception. One would expect former colonial powers to
have greater political and economic interest, and thus maintain closer connections to their
former colonies. Thus I include a dichotomous indicator for dyads that represent colonial
legacies. Using the Correlates of War Colonial Legacy dataset I code dyads with a previous
colonial relationships one, and dyads with no colonial legacy as a zero.2
Finally, domestic health funding may affect international donors aid allocations. Portions
of the foreign aid literature, reviewed in the previous chapter, identify recipient need as a
potential factor in aid allocations. If this is the case, one might expect states with lower
domestic health expenditures to receive more aid. In contrast, some scholars argue that
DAH, like other forms of foreign aid, is fungible and may be used to divert funds to other
programs. Low domestic health expenditures may indicate that health is of low priority for
a state and development aid for health would simply allow a state to spend fewer domestic
2Donors political and economic interests may also affect funding levels. Although the colonial legacy
variable covers much of this political interest, I also ran models which included two additional variables —
bilateral trade flows, as provided by the Correlates of War trade flows dataset, to measure donors economic
interests; and the S-Score (Signorino & Ritter 1999) measure of political similarity — to measure donors
political and economic interests. The results remained the same.
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funds on health. Thus, one might expect states with lower domestic health expenditures to
receive less DAH. This project does not address this debate. However, I include the recipient
state’s per capita government health expenditures measured in 2000 US dollars as reported
by the World Health Organization’s National Health Accounts summary data (World Health
Organization 2009).
3.3.3 Data Structure and Research Design
The theory presented in the previous chapter, and reiterated here, suggests that donors
allocate aid according to political influences in addition to recipient need. However, the
foreign aid literature is remarkably silent on the determinants of health sector aid, addressing
DAH allocations as apolitical or technical decisions. As a first cut at identifying donors’
priorities with regard to disease specific aid, I conducted interviews with representatives from
key donor organizations, including the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the
US Agency for International Development, as well as representatives of health ministries
in developing countries.3 During these interviews, I asked the representatives of donor
organizations about their priorities across diseases and their criteria for the allocation of
health aid. I use these quotations from these interviews as an initial test of the theory and
as a means of comparing health aid rhetoric with the rest of my results.
After reporting the results of the interviews with policy-makers, I conduct a series of
systematic analyses using the data described in the previous subsection. Within the dataset,
each observation includes data from three levels or categories — donor, recipient and disease.
Each of these categories is a separate and unique group — much like gender and ethnic
background. Although each case will include indicators for each level, no level is a subset of
another. In addition, although there is significant variation within each variable and within
each level, there are multiple variables in which there is limited variation across levels. For
3I conducted interviews at the First Global Symposium on Health Systems Research, held in Montreux,
Switzerland. This portion of my research was generously funded by a Nelle Signor Graduate Scholarship
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example, the average cost of preventing measles remains the same for every donor/recipient
combination. As a result, the research design must account for the structure of the data
by modeling the effects of these levels. Table 3.1 displays the variables used to test each
hypothesis and its corresponding level.
A simple OLS regression would fail to adequately treat variance between and across
these various levels. Although the categories overlap, no category is a subset of another or
used to model the other levels. Instead the data have a non-nested structure (Gelman &
Hill 2007). Additionally, the dollar amounts are left-censored at zero. I test the hypotheses
using five different multilevel linear models. Because each group is considered unique and the
hypotheses primarily address the affect of differences in disease, it is appropriate to use fixed
effects (Snijders & Bosker 1999).4 The first of these analyses examines aggregate disease
specific aid allocations by donor, excluding recipient specific information. The second and
third examine aggregate disease specific aid allocations by bilateral and multilateral donors.
respectively. These three analyses provide an initial cut at the effects of variation in disease
characteristics and donors’ interests. In particular, the findings suggest a clear difference in
aid allocations between bilateral and multilateral donors.
The final two analyses include recipient specific indicators. The first addresses the in-
terests of bilateral donors. The second examines the interests of multilevel donors while
accounting for recipient level indicators. The following section presents the results of these
tests. All results are produced by Stata 11.
3.4 Results
This chapter examines the relationship between aid flow and various disease characteristics
in order to identify donors’ priorities. To do this, I use a combination of anecdotal evidence
from interviews with policy-makers and systematic analyses of data. In the first subsection,
4A Hausman test indicated that fixed effects at all three levels was appropriate.
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I summarize the responses from interviews and trends within the data in order to provide
an initial examination of donors priorities. In the second subsection, I extend this with a
series of multilevel linear regressions to parse out differences in levels of aid across disease.
The results indicate that, at least in the case of bilateral donors, donor interest is a driving
force behind disease specific aid allocations.
3.4.1 Donor Priorities — Rhetoric versus Data
My initial cut at testing the hypotheses presented here was to ask policy-makers directly
about their priorities with regard to health and disease. These interviews, summarized
in Table 3.2, provide limited support for some portions of the theory, while contradicting
others. The first two columns of Table 3.2 indicate the organization that the individual
represented and whether the organization is a bilateral or multilateral donor. The third col-
umn simply indicates whether the interviewee claimed that recipient need was a determinant
of aid allocations. The final column provides a sample quotation from the interview that
illustrates how the individual perceived aid allocation decisions being made. All of the rep-
resentatives that I interviewed claimed recipient need was a determinant of aid allocations.
Indeed, with the exception of the representative from the World Bank, all representatives
that I interviewed noted, in some fashion, that recipient need was of paramount concern
in the allocation of aid. The representative from the World Bank, while also asserting the
importance of recipient need, also added the development affects of a disease as a criteria.
The results of the interviews provide greater support for the traditional view of develop-
ment aid for health as apolitical than for the theory presented in this project. Although the
theory predicts that multilateral donors will be responsive to recipient need, it also predicts
that bilateral donors will be less responsive to recipient need than to political calculations.
The results of these interviews suggested that, when identifying health issues to address,
recipient need was the primary consideration.
I followed this initial test, with an examination of the data to identify trends in disease
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specific aid. Table 3.3 provides a basic summary of the distribution of aid across diseases.
The first column presents each diseases percentage of global disability-adjusted life year
caused by infectious disease. The second column presents each diseases percentage of aid in
my dataset. The distribution of aid matches disease burden well in some cases. For example,
Malaria comprises 13.6% of global disability-adjusted life years caused by infectious disease.
It also receives 14.8% of disease specific aid. Similarly, Tuberculosis comprises 9.3% of global
DALYs caused by infectious disease and receives 11% of disease specific aid. However, there
are also examples of considerable discontinuities. For example, HIV/AIDS comprises 17.8%
of global DALYs caused by infectious disease and received 46.8% of disease specific aid. In
contrast, acute respiratory infection and diarrhoeal diseases comprise 31.9% and 24.6% of
global DALYs while only receiving 0.8% and 0.4% of aid respectively.
Additionally, the summary data presented in Table 3.3 provides support for other stud-
ies (MacKellar 2005, Shiffman 2006). The discontinuity between disease burden and aid
within my data supports the underlying premise of the theory — that the allocation of aid
is determined by more than simply need. Moreover, these data illustrate the severity of
the mis-allocation of disease specific aid. It is clear that diseases such as HIV/AIDS are
receiving a disproportionate amount of support where as disease causing more suffering,
disability, and disease such as acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeal diseases receive
far less funding. These findings not only suggest the failure of donors to identify the most
pressing humanitarian issues, but also translate into loss of human life.
Although the findings in Table 3.3 provide evidence of discontinuities between aid and
disease burden, it is necessary to disaggregate aid allocation by donors in order to further
examine the role of donor decisions on these discontinuities. Table 1.3 displays the findings
for the first multilevel model, which examines aid allocations by donor aggregated by disease.
The findings suggest that global burden of disease is not correlated with aid allocations at the
donor level, while other disease specific factors are highly correlated. The results presented
in Table 3.4 show that, although the global burden of any given disease is not correlated
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with aid, geographic limitation, cost of treatment and prevent, as well as a disease being
targeted by an international program are powerful predictors of aid allocations by donor.
The resulting negative and significant coefficient for geographic limitation indicates that
geographically limited diseases received less aid than geographically unlimited diseases across
all donors. Additionally, coefficients for cost per DALY averted and immunization are also
statistically significant. The results suggest that diseases with higher costs will receive
greater funding — roughly $1265 dollars for every $1 increase in price — where as diseases
that can be prevented through immunization will receive less funding. Additionally, indicator
for diseases targeted by an international program is also positive and significant.
Table 3.5 displays the findings of the second multilevel model, which examines aid al-
locations by bilateral donors aggregated by disease. The model is similar to the previous,
but also includes the donor burden of disease measure. The results of this model provides
insight to the role of donor interest in aid allocations by disease and lend support to sev-
eral hypotheses. In particular, the findings here suggest that bilateral donors aid allocation
reflect the potential threat of a disease.
Just as in the previous model, global burden of disease is not significant predictor of
aid. In contrast to global burden of disease, the donor burden of disease variable is positive
and significant indicating that donors provide more funding for diseases with higher local
burdens. Specifically, for every 1,000 additional disability-adjusted life years attributed to
a disease within the donor country, one would expect a $74,385 increase in aid for that
disease. These results suggest initial support for the theory and specifically for Hypothesis
1. Bilateral donors provide greater funding for diseases that can/do threaten their domestic
constituencies. This result, in addition to the insignificance of the global burden of disease
measure suggests that bilateral donors do so while disregarding need.
Unlike, the previous model however, geographic limitations is insignificant as a predic-
tor, as is whether or not a diseases is the target of an international program. The costs per
DALY averted both significant predictors of donor aid. The coefficient for cost is positive
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and significant — suggesting that for every one dollar increase in the price of treatment,
one would expect a $42822 increase in aid for that disease. In contrast, there is no signif-
icant relationship between immunization and aid. These results provide initial support for
Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Table 3.6 presents the results from the third multilevel model. This model examines
aid allocations by multilateral donors across disease. Because multilateral donors serve a
constituency wider than a single state, I have excluded the donor burden of disease variable.
The results provide evidence for the theorized differences between bilateral and multilateral
donors. In particular, the findings here suggest that multilateral donors are more responsive
to international concerns and humanitarian concerns.
In contrast to the bilateral donor model, global burden of disease is a positive and
significant. Indeed, for every 1,000 disability adjusted life years as a result of disease, a
multilateral donor would be expected to give an additional $139,685. This is substantial
when you consider that this is 1000 DALYs, not lives lost, and the population is global. For
example, the death of a single child at age 5 in a country with the average live expectancy of
50 produces 45 DALYs. Thus, 1000 DALYs produced globally, is quite small. These results
lend initial support to Hypothesis 5 — that multilateral donors will be positively correlated
with global burden of disease. However, it is not possible to determine whether this pattern
is due to multilateral donors being more responsive to the interests of a global constituency
or to global need from this model. While the results show a positive correlation, it is also
possible that multilateral donors’ allocation fail to reflect need at the recipient level. This
distributional question will be addressed further in subsequent tests.
Additionally, the indicator for a disease targeted by and international program is pos-
itive and significant, suggesting that — unsurprisingly — multilateral donors respond to
the international targeting programs. In contrast, the remaining variables — geographic
limitation, cost per DALY averted, and immunization are all insignificant. This may sug-
gest that multilateral donors are primarily responsive to suffering and death rather than
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cost-effectiveness or other considerations. This will be examined further in subsequent tests.
3.4.2 Analysis of Aid
Although the previous results provide some initial evidence in support of the theory and
several hypotheses, the analyses of donors’ disease specific aid aggregated by disease fail
to address a second and more pressing component. While the results indicate that donor
interest plays a role in aid allocations, the results presented thus far fail to address whether
donor interests is prioritized above humanitarian need at the recipient level. In order to test
this second component, I conduct two further anaylses — present in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 presents the findings of the final two multilevel linear regression models. The
first model displays the coefficients and standard errors for aid allocations from bilateral
donors by recipient and disease. The second model displays the coefficients and standard
errors for aid allocations from multilateral donor by disease and recipients. The results
provide evidence that bilateral donors are more responsive to diseases that threaten their
constituent populations. Moreover, the results also suggest that multilateral donors, with
more varied constituencies, are more responsive to global threats and recipient needs.
The first model, which uses bilateral DAH allocations, provides evidence that bilateral
donors’ health concerns may distort disease specific health aid allocations. Even while con-
trolling for other sources of donor interest, the donors’ burden of disease is positive and
significant. Indeed, a disease which produced an additional 1,000 years of life lost due to
death or disability in a single recipient country would be expected to produce a $7111 in-
crease in aid to a recipient for that specific disease. This finding provides support for the
first hypothesis — a positive correlation between donor disease burden and allocation of
disease specific aid. In contrast, recipient burden of disease — the indicator that, according
to most rhetoric regarding DAH, should be most important — is not a significant predictor
of bilateral donor aid allocations. In addition, the geographic limitation variable is negative
and significant, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. This indicates that donors provide less money
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for diseases which are geographically limited such as schistosomiasis. In combination, these
three results clearly indicate that, at the recipient level, disease specific aid allocations are
more highly correlated with bilateral donor interests than recipient need. As suggested by
the theory, it appears that bilateral donors prioritize diseases with the greatest likelihood of
affecting their own populations.
Similarly, the results provide evidence supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4. The cost per
DALY averted variable produces a positive and significant coefficient. This suggests that
for every $1 increase in the cost, bilateral donors will likely spend an addition $2,913 in aid
for that disease within a recipient state — supporting Hypothesis 3. This finding supports
that theoretic expectation that bilateral donors prefer to address high cost diseases abroad
to prevent having to pay higher costs for dealing with them at home. In contrast, the
immunization variable produces a negative and significant coefficient. This suggests that
bilateral donors do not prioritize diseases that are easily prevented within their own borders,
which supports Hypothesis 4.
Combined, however, these results fail to support the rhetoric provided by policy-makers,
that donors choose select disease that affect the most people and/or have the most cost-
effective options in an effort to maximize the benefit of aid within a recipient state. Contrary
to the idea that disease specific development aid for health is allocated with the intention
of alleviating suffering for the greatest number of people in recipient countries, these results
support the first four hypotheses and suggest that bilateral disease specific development aid
is intended to alleviate the threats to populations within the donor state. Indeed, of all of the
variables included in the model, only those representing donors’ interests are significant —
even when controlling for other indicators that typically influence foreign aid decisions. The
only significant control variable is colonial legacy. As expected, the coefficient is positive and
significant — indicating that bilateral donors provide disease specific health aid to recipient
states to whom they have a historical connection. Although not the direct object of the
theory or any of the hypotheses, the significance of colonial legacy further supports the
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argument that development aid for health is, in fact, subject to political influence.
The second model in Table 3.7 analyzes multilateral allocations by recipient and disease.
The findings of the second model contrast with the bilateral donor model in several ways.
Specifically, the results provide evidence that multilateral donors are responsive to need as
measured by disease burden, both globally and within the recipient state — supporting
Hypothesis 5. Additional support is also found for Hypothesis 7.
Unlike the previous model, the global burden of a disease is a significant and positive
predictor of multilateral disease specific aid allocations. As the number of years lost due to
premature death and/or disability rises by 1,000 worldwide, one would expect a more than
$33,000 increase in funding for that disease from one multilateral donor to one recipient
state. This evidence supports the theory that multilateral donors are more responsive to
global need and/or interests and supports Hypothesis 5. In addition, the burden of a disease
within the recipient state is also positive and significant. Multilateral donors are predicted
to give approximately $890 more for a disease for every increase of 1,000 DALYs within the
recipient country. Unlike the previous model, multilateral donors allocations reflect need
within recipient countries. This evidence supports Hypothesis 9 in the case of multilateral
donors and draws a clear distinction between bilateral and multilateral donors in terms their
responsiveness to suffering in recipient states
Unexpectedly, the coefficient for geographic limitation is insignificant. Providing no
evidence in support of Hypothesis 6. Likewise, the cost per DALY averted and immunization
are insignificant — failing to support Hypotheses 7 and 8. In contrast to the bilateral model
these results confirm the previous suggestion that multilateral donors are more responsive
to suffering and need, than to calculations of constituent interests and cost-effectiveness.
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3.5 Analysis and Conclusion
The results presented in the previous section offer considerable insight into the allocation
of disease specific development aid for health and donor priorities. Although policy-makers’
rhetoric often suggests that development aid for health is apolitical — allocated strictly on
the basis of need and intended to maximize alleviation of suffering — the findings in this
chapter suggest that some DAH allocations are decidedly political. Not only do the results
provide evidence in support of the theory established in the previous chapter, but they also
directly support several hypotheses from this section. Table 3.8 summarizes the hypotheses
and findings.
The distribution of aid across diseases within this study clearly illustrates some disconti-
nuities between aid and the burden of disease. The analyses produced here demonstrate that
those discontinuities can be partially explained by variation in donor interests. However, the
results of this chapter also indicate clear differences in behavior across different types of
donors. As the Table 3.8 summarizes, bilateral donor allocations were positively correlated
with donor burden of disease and negatively correlated with geographic spread. These find-
ings are not terribly surprising, suggesting that donors provide more aid to diseases that
are more likely to affect their constituency. However, bilateral donor allocations are also
positively correlated with the cost of the disease. This suggests that donors provide more
aid for diseases with higher costs as it is cheaper to address diseases elsewhere than to deal
with outbreaks domestically. Likewise, bilateral aid is also negatively correlated with im-
munizable diseases. This not only supports Hypothesis 4, but suggests that donors provide
less aid for diseases that are easily controlled in developed countries through vaccinations.
Yet, most surprising is that recipient burden of disease is an insignificant predictor of aid.
Not only are bilateral donors providing aid according to the interests of their constituency,
but the resulting allocation fails to correlate with recipient need. In contrast to bilateral
donors, multilateral donors aid allocations are correlated only with global burden of disease
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and recipient burden of disease.
Although levels of DAH have increased over the last several decades, the findings sug-
gest that these increases do not necessarily reflect developing state need. The findings here
suggest that discontinuities between aid and disease are the result of donor interests. Specif-
ically, the results provide two primary conclusions: (1) Bilateral allocate aid according to
their interest. This mean that they prioritize diseases that may affect their domestic popu-
lations — potentially under-funding the most pressing diseases in developing countries; (2)
Multilateral donors are more responsive to need in the form of global and recipient disease
burden. Additionally, these findings support arguments within the foreign aid literature
which suggest that multilateral organizations are better at identifying and addressing hu-
manitarian need.
As many studies of other types aid have concluded, aid allocations can be and are dis-
torted by donor interests. Disease specific aid is no exception. These analyses extend the
foreign aid literature to the understudied area of development aid for health and find dis-
turbingly similar results of both theoretical and practical importance. In contrast to much
of the literature on development aid for health, these findings lend support to the argument
that development aid for health is subject to similar political pressures and constraints as
other forms of foreign aid. Thus, it is necessary to extend the theories and study of foreign
aid allocations to development aid for health.
It is also essential to consider how the problems and theories of health aid might con-
tribute to the foreign aid literature as a whole. For example, unlike other areas of foreign
aid, disease specific aid for health is directed at clearly identifiable and agreed upon prob-
lems, with known causes and processes, and concrete solutions. Money to prevent and treat
measles is spent on specific activities such as vaccines and immunization clinics — activities
scientifically linked to direct, inarguable and effective decrease the spread of measles. The
processes involved are well documented and the activities produce measurable improvements.
In contrast, democratization aid is spent on a number of activities such as educating and
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registering potential voters, training legislative and judicial officers, and supporting politi-
cal parties and other aspects of civil society (Finkel, Perez-Linan & Seligson 2007, Scott &
Steele 2011) — activities which may directly or indirectly lead to improvements to democ-
racy. Yet, even where democratization aid can be linked to such improvements, the process
by which it does so remains unclear and a matter for debate and interpretation. The results
here suggest that, even in areas of foreign aid where problems and solutions are clear, donors’
interest may distort allocations and the benefits. By applying the theoretical insight provide
by the study of health, scholar may be better able to address similar questions regarding
other forms of foreign aid as well as other issue areas such as environmental cooperation.
Practically, these results suggest that international efforts to improve health and control
infectious disease should account for varying political interests and priorities of donors. If,
as the findings suggest, bilateral donors are more responsive to diseases that threaten their
own populations while multilateral donors are more responsive to humanitarian concerns,
it is possible to devise disease control plans and programs that account for these expecta-
tions. It is possible for bilateral and multilateral donors to coordinate their disease control
efforts, providing a division of labor among various types of donors. For example, because
multilateral donors enjoy more flexibility, it is possible that for multilateral donors to fill
in funding gaps to diseases that do not threaten and are therefore neglected by bilateral
donors. In addition, any consideration of “division of labor” must also account for various
philanthropic donors. Organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carter Center, all contribute large quantities of aid for
health specific and diseases specific research, prevention, and treatment and thus may assist
in offsetting the distortions caused by aid flows that reflect bilateral donors’ interests. It is
essential, however, to also note that bilateral donors remain the largest contributors to de-
velopment aid for health. While a division of labor among donors may improve the balance
of aid and disease burden, attempting to find a true balance will require the cooperation of
bilateral donors as well.
77
These findings also provide promising areas for additional research. Future research
should address differences between communicable and non-communicable disease. If the
theory presented here holds, the results should show bilateral donors providing more aid
funds for communicable diseases to the neglect of high burden non-communicable diseases
such as heart disease.
Additionally, although I argue that donors’ interests lead to distortion in DAH allocations
by individual donors, it is necessary to consider the aggregate effect of that distortion.
Development aid for health makes up a substantial portion of health expenditures for many
developing states. Discontinuities in aid across diseases is not merely a matter of budget.
Indeed, where donors’ interest distort aid allocations, the results can be measured in terms
of infections, disability and death. If the theory from the previous chapter holds, it should
be possible to identify correlations between donor interests and disease specific deaths.
78
T
ab
le
3.
1:
L
is
t
of
H
y
p
ot
h
es
es
an
d
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
L
ev
el
D
at
a
S
ou
rc
e
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
1
D
on
or
B
u
rd
en
of
D
is
ea
se
D
on
or
G
lo
b
al
B
u
rd
en
of
D
is
ea
se
P
ro
je
ct
R
ep
or
t
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
2
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
li
m
it
s
D
is
ea
se
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
3
C
os
t
p
er
D
A
L
Y
av
er
te
d
D
is
ea
se
J
am
is
on
et
al
20
05
or
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
4
Im
m
u
n
iz
at
io
n
D
is
ea
se
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
5
G
lo
b
al
B
u
rd
en
of
D
is
ea
se
D
on
or
G
lo
b
al
B
u
rd
en
of
D
is
ea
se
P
ro
je
ct
R
ep
or
t
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
6
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
li
m
it
s
D
is
ea
se
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
7
C
os
t
p
er
D
A
L
Y
av
er
te
d
D
is
ea
se
J
am
is
on
et
al
20
05
or
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
8
Im
m
u
n
iz
at
io
n
D
is
ea
se
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
H
y
p
ot
h
es
is
9
R
ec
ip
ie
n
t
B
u
rd
en
of
D
is
ea
se
R
ec
ip
ie
n
t
G
lo
b
al
B
u
rd
en
of
D
is
ea
se
P
ro
je
ct
R
ep
or
t
79
T
ab
le
3.
2:
D
on
or
D
is
ea
se
P
ri
or
it
ie
s
—
In
te
rv
ie
w
R
es
u
lt
s
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
D
on
or
T
y
p
e
Q
u
ot
at
io
n
R
ec
ip
ie
n
t
N
ee
d
T
h
e
W
or
ld
B
an
k
M
u
lt
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“T
h
e
W
or
ld
B
an
k
fo
cu
se
s
on
h
ea
lt
h
in
it
ia
-
ti
ve
s
th
at
fi
t
w
it
h
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
go
al
s.
”
T
h
e
W
or
ld
H
ea
lt
h
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
M
u
lt
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“W
e
w
or
k
w
it
h
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
to
id
en
ti
fy
th
ei
r
p
ri
or
it
ie
s
an
d
d
es
ig
n
p
ro
gr
am
s
th
at
m
at
ch
th
os
e
p
ri
or
it
ie
s.
”
U
N
IC
E
F
M
u
lt
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“W
e
d
es
ig
n
in
te
rv
en
ti
on
s
to
ad
d
re
ss
h
ea
lt
h
is
su
es
th
at
ca
u
se
th
e
m
os
t
su
ff
er
in
g”
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
U
n
io
n
M
u
lt
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“R
ec
ip
ie
n
t
n
ee
d
is
a
p
ri
m
ar
y
co
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
in
th
e
al
lo
ca
ti
on
of
h
ea
lt
h
ai
d
”
U
S
A
ge
n
cy
fo
r
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
D
ev
el
-
op
m
en
t
B
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“T
h
e
p
ro
gr
am
s
w
e
su
p
p
or
t
ar
e
d
es
ig
n
ed
to
p
ro
v
id
e
th
e
gr
ea
te
st
go
o
d
to
m
os
t
p
eo
p
le
.”
A
u
st
ra
li
an
A
ge
n
cy
fo
r
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
B
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“A
u
sA
ID
fo
cu
se
s
on
d
is
ea
se
s
th
at
h
av
e
th
e
gr
ea
te
st
im
p
ac
t
d
ev
el
op
in
g
st
at
es
.”
S
w
is
s
A
ge
n
cy
fo
r
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
an
d
C
o
op
er
at
io
n
B
il
at
er
al
Y
es
“
S
A
D
C
fo
cu
se
s
on
p
ro
gr
am
s
th
at
re
ac
h
th
e
gr
ea
te
st
n
u
m
b
er
of
p
eo
p
le
”
80
Table 3.3: Percentage of Infectious Disease DALYs and Percentage of Aggregate Aid
Disease % of DALYs % of Aid
Polio 0 6.4
HIV/AIDS 17.8 46.8
Malaria 13.6 14.8
Tuberculosis 9.3 11
Measles 5.6 2
Pandemic Influenza 0.5 1
Cholera 6.2 0.6
Trypanosomiasis 0.7 0.009
Guinea Worm 0.4 0.1
Intestinal Parasites 1.1 0
Acute Respiratory Infection 31.9 0.8
Leprosy 0 0.3
Dengue Fever 0.16 0.3
Diarrhoeal Diseases 24.6 0.4
Onchocerciasis 0.16 0.2
Non-HIV Sexually Transmitted Diseases 3 3.6
Tetnus 1.9 1.9
Viral Hepatitis 0.5 0
Chagas 0 0.3
Leishmaniasis 0.8 1.8
Menningitis 3.7 0.2
Schistosomiasis 0.6 0.2
Pertussis 3.8 1.8
Childhood Diseases 11 3.7
Tropical Cluster Diseases 4.5 0.6
Table 3.4: Donor Allocations Aggregated by Disease
Variable Model 1
Global Burden of Disease 112336 (173377.4)
Geographic Limitation -27000000* (11900000)
Cost per DALY 1265.2* (202.42)
Targeted Disease 3330000* (1180000)
Immunization -1450000* (121000)
N 1496
∗ = p-value less than .05
Fixed Effects coefficients omitted
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Table 3.5: Bilateral Donor Allocations Aggregated by Disease
Variable Model 2
Global Burden of Disease -33505 (62943.74)
Donor Burden of Disease 74385.52* (25752.5)
Geographic Limitation -3271446 (3889037)
Cost per DALY 42822* (67.57)
Targeted Disease 5622850 (3889037)
Immunization -428933 (3864049)
N 976
∗ = p-value less than .05
Fixed Effects coefficients omitted
Table 3.6: Multilateral Donor Allocations Aggregated by Disease
Variable Model 3
Global Burden of Disease 139685.9* (51797.6)
Geographic Limitation -38100000 (33600000)
Cost per DALY 28048.7 (62570.6)
Targeted Disease 7960000* (353000)
Immunization 2700000 (3320000)
N 520
∗ = p-value less than .05
Fixed Effects coefficients omitted
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Table 3.7: Multilevel Linear Models for Bilateral and Multilateral Donors
Variable Bilateral Multilateral
Donor Burden of Disease 7111.42*(890.5)
Recipient Burden of Disease 3.139 (5.58) 890.38*(32.2)
Global Burden of Disease -7203.5 (6728.6) 4056.01* (843.3)
Geographic Limitation -123491.4*(25804.6) -101945 (65745)
Cost per DALY averted 2913.4* (248.3) 237.6 (125.8)
Targeted Disease 14960(9164.9) 30473* (68026.6)
Immunization -90029.3* (23024) 236104.4* (530440.75)
Colonial Legacy 203079.6*(28680.3)
Recipient GDP/capita -0.348(0.715) -4.314 (1.66)
Recipient Population 0.042 (0.042) 2.83* (.155)
N 161148 84500
∗ = p-value less than .05
Fixed Effects coefficients omitted
Table 3.8: Support for Hypotheses
Hypothesis Donor Type Independent Variables Support
Hypothesis 1 Bilateral Donor Burden of Disease Yes
Hypothesis 2 Bilateral Geographic limits Yes
Hypothesis 3 Bilateral Cost per DALY averted Yes
Hypothesis 4 Bilateral Immunization Yes
Hypothesis 5 Multilateral Global Burden of Disease Yes
Hypothesis 6 Multilateral Geographic limits No
Hypothesis 7 Multilateral Cost per DALY averted No
Hypothesis 8 Multilateral Immunization No
Hypothesis 9 Bilateral Recipient Burden of Disease No
Hypothesis 9 Multilateral Recipient Burden of Disease Yes
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Chapter 4
Disease Control Activities and Donor
Priorities
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I extend the findings from the previous chapter to the funding of specific
disease control activities. The results of the previous chapter suggests that some donors
strategically invest disease specific health aid across diseases in order to maximize their ben-
efits. The theory suggests that donors are not only strategic in their allocation of aid by
disease, but also in their allocation by activity. Specifically, donors prioritize strategies dif-
ferently based upon the threat posed by a specific disease. This chapter examines differences
in funding by activity across diseases in order to further illuminate donors’ priorities.
In the following section, I outline the expectations established in the theory regarding
the allocation of aid across disease control activities and develop testable hypotheses. I then
address the data and research methods, followed by statistical analyses of the data to test
the hypotheses.
4.2 Disease Control Activities and Donor Priorities
Studying disease specific development aid for health offers many advantages, including spe-
cific markers for donor interests. Unlike other areas of foreign aid — in which donor interest
is generally measured using a combination of trade variables and alliance correlations —
donors’ interests with regard to disease are easily measured using health variables such as
burden of disease. The theory suggests that these variables will affect donors’ allocation of
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aid across diseases, and the findings in the previous chapter supports this. In addition to
these hypotheses, the theory also suggests that donors are strategic in the activities that
they choose to fund. Specifically, it suggests that donors prioritize efforts to prevent the
spread of disease to their populations over treatment and care of those already infected in
developing countries.
As the theory chapter established, the control of communicable diseases is a semi-public
good. Although an individual cannot be prevented from enjoying the benefits of disease con-
trol, enjoyment of those benefits is not evenly distributed. The enjoyment of improvements
to disease control are distributed based upon the geographic spread of the disease. Diseases
such as schistosomiasis and trypanosomiasis are geographically limited by the intermediary
vectors necessary for disease transmission. As a result, the negative consequences of these
diseases are centralized in areas where prevalence is high, while geographic regions outside
the range of the intermediary vector remain unhindered. The benefits of improved control
of these diseases is only enjoyed by individuals within the diseases geographic range. In
comparison, diseases such as pertussis, tuberculosis and influenza spread easily and rapidly
from one individual to another through casual contact. As a result, these diseases vary in
the degree of threat they pose to populations across the globe. The negative consequences
of diseases such as pertussis and influenza are more likely to be shared by the global public.
Likewise, the benefits of disease control are shared more widely as well.
The previous chapter used these differences in the negative consequences of infection and
the benefits of improved disease control across diseases to examine donors’ priorities. As
expected, donors’ priorities for addressing and controlling these diseases vary based upon how
much of a threat each disease is to the donor’s constituent population — specifically, bilateral
donors allocate aid in ways to maximize their payoff. If donors provide aid based upon
their interests, this would provide some explanation for the discontinuity between burden of
disease and aid. However, allocation of disease specific aid is not just the distribution of aid
across diseases. Donors also allocate disease specific aid across a variety of potential disease
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control activities. Just as aid directed a at different diseases produce more or less public
consequences, disease control activities also produce benefits that vary across a continuum
of publicness.
4.2.1 Disease Control Activities
Efforts to control disease may take many forms — each producing its own range of bene-
fits. For example, efforts to control HIV/AIDS range from improved screening of blood for
transfusions, promotion of condom usage, improved access to anti-retroviral medications,
education, prevention of mother-child transmission, and medical research, among many oth-
ers. Each of these activities produces a benefit that has a degree of publicness. Of the
activities listed here, medical research produces the most public benefits. Scientific research
produces knowledge and information about the disease in question — in this case HIV/AIDS
— including cause, mode of transmission, and best practices for prevention and treatment.
Because of the high cost of medical research, individuals afford to engage in research with-
out support from a government or donor entity. Research produces knowledge that is then
shared and disseminated providing benefits to the public as a whole. In comparison, pro-
vision of anti-retroviral medications produces a less public benefit. Anti-retroviral Therapy
(ART), provide the benefits of extending the life of an individual with HIV/AIDS — a ben-
efit primarily enjoyed by the individual and thus primarily private. However, this benefit is
not strictly private. The extension of the life of an individual infected with HIV/AIDS is
also beneficial to the individual’s family, as well as providing the more abstract economic
benefits to society associated with maintaining a healthy worker. Additionally, provision of
ART includes additional public benefits — specifically, a reduction of transmission. Pro-
vision of ART alters the incentives of an infected individual. Without ART, an infected
individual is living with a shorter shadow of the future. As a result, behaviors that might
otherwise be considered dangerous or reckless are of little or no consequence — including
actions that might encourage the spread of HIV/AIDS. Where infected individuals have
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access to ART, the use of condoms and other safe sex precautions increases (de Mello e
Souza 2007, Pisani 2009). Additionally, individuals infected with HIV/AIDS who are also
taking anti-retroviral medications have a lower viral load, meaning that the virus is present
at lower levels in their body tissues and fluids than in an infected individual who is not
receiving ART (de Mello e Souza 2007). This not only extends the life of the individual,
but also decreases the likelihood of transmission should an uninfected person come into con-
tact with that individual’s bodily fluids. Thus, while provision of treatment may appear to
produce strictly private benefits, in fact, it produces a mix of private and public benefits.
Similarly, the extraction of a guinea worm from a patient’s leg produces clear private
benefits to the patient. Guinea worm is a parasite contracted by drinking water contaminated
with small copepods or water fleas that have been infested with guinea worm larva. Once
these copepods enter the human digestive track, they hatch into worms that burrow into
the body cavity. Upon reaching maturity the guinea worms mate and the female guinea
worm migrates to one of the infected individual’s extremities — usually a leg or a foot —
where it produces a blister. This blister ruptures, revealing the end of the female guinea
worm. When the sore comes into contact with water, the worm deposits guinea worm larvae
into the water. A single female guinea worm is capable of releasing hundreds of thousands
of larvae. These larvae are then eaten by copepods, beginning the cycle again. Treatment
for guinea worm includes wrapping the exposed end of the guinea worm around a stick and
slowly extracting the worm over the course of weeks or months. The removal of the parasite,
although painful, frees the patient of future pain and potential disability as well as hastens
the healing of the sore which, if not properly treated, may develop a secondary infection.
However, proper treatment of a guinea worm infection also prevents further infections. By
preventing exposure to water and extracting the parasite, the proper treatment of guinea
worm also reduces the risk of future infection to other individuals that use the same water
sources (The Carter Center 2011).
The variation of shared benefit across types of disease control activities provide an oppor-
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tunity to further examine the role of donor interest in disease specific health aid allocations.
By examining the distribution of aid across various disease control activities, it is possible
to address donors’ priorities in terms of activities. In addition, examining the distribution of
aid across activities within a single disease may help to further illuminate donors interests.
Types of Activities
Efforts to control the spread of infections disease may include any of several types of activi-
ties. For the purposes of this analysis I identify eight broad categories:
Prevention: Prevention consists of a collection of activities directed at preventing infection
and/or the spread of disease. This category encompasses a variety of activities which vary
considerably across diseases. For example, the most obvious prevention activity is the use of
vaccinations to prevent infections of measles, polio, tetanus and pertussis. Yet, prevention
can also include a variety of other activities such as the distribution of condoms to prevent
HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, the use of a filter straw to prevent
ingestion of water fleas that cause guinea worm, or the use of pesticide treated bed nets
to prevent malaria. These activities not only prevent a single individual from becoming
infected, but also provide added benefits to society by decreasing the likelihood of infections
in the public as a whole. Immunizing children against polio not only protects the individual
child, but decreases the potential for a polio outbreak. Moreover, each individual with polio
immunity increases the potential for the eradication of polio entirely — an outcome that
would be highly beneficial to populations worldwide.
Treatment: Treatment consists of any curative or life-extending measure taken to combat
an infection. Treatment varies considerably across diseases as well as in terms of effective-
ness and cost. For example, treatment cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases is generally
the administration of oral rehydration therapy — a solution of salts and sugar intended to
maintain hydration and electrolyte balance. This treatment is relatively inexpensive, cost-
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ing approximately 10 cents per dose and is 90% effective in prevent death (World Health
Organization 2010a). In contrast, treatment for HIV/AIDs is the administration of anti-
retroviral therapy — a combination of at least three anti-viral medications taken daily.
ART is expensive, with the average wholesale treatment costing between $2000 and $11,000
per year (prices vary based upon the combination of drugs in the cocktail) (World Health
Organization 2010a). Moreover, ART is not a curative measure. Although deaths as a result
of advanced AIDS has decreased dramatically since the introduction of combination therapy,
ART is life-extending, but not a curative measure. Individuals with HIV/AIDS are reliant
upon ART for the remainder of their lives. In addition, ART also causes an extensive list of
side effects including peripheral neuropathy, liver failure, and mitochondrial toxicity (World
Health Organization 2010a). Treatments for other diseases include antimalarial medication
for malaria, extraction of guinea worm, and antibiotics for acute respiratory infections.
Infrastructure:Infrastructure consists of support for formal structures that support pub-
lic health including the building of clinic, hospitals, sanitation systems, etc. Building and
supporting infrastructure is relatively expensive yet enduring. The construction of a Tuber-
culosis hospital or a sexually transmitted disease clinic may cost millions of dollars. Yet,
once built, the structure itself remains long into the future. However, infrastructure high-
lights an ongoing concern within the health aid literature. Many recipient states that cannot
afford to build hospitals, clinics and sanitation systems, are also incapable of funding the
continued use of those assets without donor support. Thus, in many cases, investment in
infrastructure is a long term commitment for donors.
Administrative Assistance: Administrative assistance consists of the provision of funds
or resources in order to improve the administration of health. Administrative assistance may
include a number of activities, including providing advisors for the development of policy, the
training of personnel, as well as studies on the effectiveness of various policies and programs.
Research: Research consists of the provision of funds or resources in support of increasing
medical and scientific knowledge about a particular disease. This may include data collec-
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tion, clinical trials, research conferences, as well as education programs for the training of
researchers.
Surveillance/Responsiveness: Surveillance and responsiveness consist of the monitor-
ing, reporting and preparing to address disease outbreaks. The monitoring and reporting of
disease outbreaks is undertaken by a diverse network of state and international level orga-
nizations. For example, within the United States, the Center for Disease Control monitors
and reports on disease outbreaks both within the country as well as globally. The Global
Observation Alert Response Network (GOARN), directed by the World Health Organiza-
tion, collects reports on disease outbreak from medical professionals worldwide and provides
recommendations on best-practices for containing and addressing outbreaks to affected coun-
tries (?). In addition, The Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) created by
Canada in cooperation with the WHO, collects data on outbreaks through the examination
of web reports. After verifying the information, GPHIN provides detailed tracking of out-
breaks and is the primary source for WHO reports (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2009).
These efforts identify disease outbreaks, provide information to the public, and offer advise
for addressing the spread of disease.
Education:Education consists of providing individuals or groups with information in an
effort to promote behavioral and/or societal change. Education efforts are diverse and can
range from providing information on best practices for preventing or treating a disease, to
sexual education. It can include anything from education of families on the proper use of
insecticide treated bed nets to prevent malaria, to promotion of safe sex practices.
General/Access: In addition to the activities noted above, many donors also provide aid
intended to support and increase individuals’ access to health systems. In many developing
countries, the primary obstacle to the provision of health services is a general lack of health
system support. In countries with low urbanization, many individuals have few opportunities
for accessing the health system. In addition, in low income countries, where populations
are most vulnerable to infectious diseases, the meager resources available for health are
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insufficient for dealing with the overall societal burden of sickness. As a result, donors often
provide aid intended to improve services and accessibility for a specific disease.
4.2.2 Globalness, Publicness and Donor Interests
As I argued in the second chapter, the nature of infectious diseases structures donors in-
centives to provide disease specific aid. Those incentives are a result variations in disease
characteristics across diseases. Specifically, that donors have incentive to allocate funds to-
ward diseases that are most likely to threaten their constituent populations. As a result, the
geographic limitations, or lack thereof, of an individual disease would impact the amount
of money donors contributed for that disease. Diseases that produced negatives on a global
scale were expected to be the focus of donors allocations. However, as argued above, donors
may also behave strategically in determining which of the activities described above to fund.
I contend that donors have incentive to invest in activities for which the positive results
are most global and public in nature. Just as with diseases, different activities produce
results at different levels. For example, surveillance and reporting activities on Sudden
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 disseminated information about and advice
for handling outbreaks of disease. The results of these activities were modified travel plans,
enactment of best practices to reduce spread, advance warning to allow for better prepara-
tion worldwide, and greater protection of populations everywhere. The benefits associated
with surveillance, monitoring and reporting were shared globally — although there some
distributional differences may have remained. In contrast, treatment for leprosy, a relatively
rare bacterial infection, primarily benefits the single patient being treated.I argue that, just
as donors have incentive to allocate resources across disease in a manner to maximize their
enjoyment of the benefits, donors also have incentive to allocate resources across activities
in order to maximize their enjoyment of the benefits.
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Variation Across Activities
To maximize their enjoyment of the benefits, a donor has incentives to select a disease
activity that produced the results with the highest degree of public-ness. Specifically, donors
would select activities for which the benefits are difficult to exclude others from enjoying and
that are not diminished by others’ partaking of those benefits. While no activity produces
purely public goods, there is variation in degree of public-ness among the results produced.
In the previous example comparing surveillance of SARS and treatment of leprosy, the
surveillance of SARS produced results that were more public in nature. No individual or
country could be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the information that was publicly
available. Additionally, no one state’s use of the information precluded another state from
using and benefiting from the same information. In comparison, the treatment of leprosy
produced benefits that were only enjoyed by the patient that received treatment. Others
are easily excluded from enjoying those benefits and providing treatment to one patient
diminished another’s opportunity to enjoy those benefits. If, as I contend, donors allocate
aid toward activities with the most public benefits, one would expect donors to provide more
funding for surveillance and monitoring than treatment.
Table 4.1 displays the eight disease control categories described above and the relative
public-ness of their benefits. As determined by the previous example, surveillance and
monitoring produce highly public benefits whereas treatment produces relatively private
benefits. In contrast to treatment, prevention produces benefits that are slightly more public
in nature. Prevention of a single infection decreases the likelihood of additional infections.
For example, the use of insecticide treated bed nets prevents malaria infections. Malaria
is spread when a mosquito that has bitten and consumed the blood of an infected person,
bites an uninfected person. As a result, preventing a malaria infection through the use of
insecticide treated bed nets prevents further spread of the disease. While the one individual’s
enjoyment of decreased rates of transmission does not prevent others from enjoying similarly
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low rates of transmission, these benefits are local. Thus, individuals outside of the range
of a single mosquito could be excluded. The same is true for vaccine-preventable diseases.
Although all members of the system enjoy the benefits of low transmission rates, the benefits
are localized, enjoyed only by those who would have come into contact with the disease had
that individual not be vaccinated. Thus, while benefits of prevention are more public than
the benefits of treatment, they are also less public than the benefits of surveillance.
Infrastructure, like treatment, has a low degree of public-ness. Distance from hospitals
and clinics as well as the cost of treatment effectively exclude large numbers of people from
enjoying the benefits these facilities provide. Moreover, the limited resources available for
health in developing states necessarily means that the benefits provided by such facilities are
rivalrous — providing care for one individual necessarily means there is another than will not
get care. For example, in a hospital, every bed used by a patient cannot be used by others.
Administrative assistance is similarly low with regard to the public-ness of its benefits .
Individuals can be excluded easily from enjoying the benefits of improved policies, and the
benefits of some policies may be rivalrous. In contrast, the benefits associated with research
are more public. The benefits of data collection, clinical trials and other research activities
are non-rival. One individual’s use of data or one individual’s identification of a potentially
useful drug does not hinder another individual from enjoying the same benefits. However,
the benefits of research activities can be excludable. For example, a clinical trial that
confirms the effectiveness of a treatment produces both knowledge and potential cure. While
the knowledge is freely disseminated, individuals can be excluded from the cure through
cost. Education also produces moderately public benefits. Education is intended to produce
changes in behavior. For example, efforts to debunk the myth that having sex with a virgin
will cure one of HIV/AIDS are intended dissuade individuals from engaging in behaviors that
have a high risk spreading disease. The benefit of such a behavioral change is a decreased
risk of infection for some of those near the individual. This benefit is non-rival, however
and individual can be excluded from enjoying the benefits through distance or other factors
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(e.g. non-virgins). Finally, activities intended to improve support for and access to health
systems produces benefits with relatively low public-ness. While providing more resources for
health systems means that more individuals may have access to those systems, the resources
available remain limited and thus rivalrous. Additionally, if improvements to health systems
are tied to geographic locations, individuals can be exclude geographically.
Donors seeking to maximize their enjoyment of the benefits produced through their aid
will allocate funds to the activities that produce benefits that are the most public. Specif-
ically, one would expect donors to provide the highest levels of aid for surveillance and
responsiveness activities as well as moderate levels of aid for research and prevention. As a
result, I proposed the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 10: Donors will provide the greatest portion of aid for surveillance and
responsiveness activities in developing countries.
Hypothesis 11: Donors will allocate a greater portion of aid for research than other activ-
ities that produce less public benefits.
Types of Donors
Just as in the previous chapter, the geographical range of a donor’s constituency would be
expected to affect the donor’s aid allocation behavior. Specifically, bilateral donors, with
localized constituencies, would have greater incentive to allocate aid to activities with the
most public benefits. As noted in the previous chapter, it is less costly to observe and con-
trol the spread of disease elsewhere, than to treat disease at home. Thus, bilateral donors
have incentive to invest in surveillance and monitoring as well as supporting the outbreak
responsiveness of developing countries. In contrast, multilateral donors have less centralized
constituencies with more diverse interests. While the benefit of surveillance is still high,
multilateral donors are likely to spread aid more evenly across a greater variety of activities.
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Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 12: Bilateral donors will provide more aid for activities with greater public
benefit (e.g. surveillance, research, and prevention).
Variation Across Disease
The degree of public-ness associated with disease control activities is only half of the story
however. Because poor health is centralized in developing countries and disease specific
aid is sent to developing countries, there will inevitably be some distributional effects upon
the benefits of that aid. This remains the case when discussing disease activities. In the
previous example, surveillance of SARS produces arguably public results. Yet, the benefits
of surveillance are not always shared with the entire international community. Surveillance
of geographically limited diseases such as trypanosomiasis, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, and
malaria produce equally public benefits. Those benefits however, are distributed only within
the geographic limits of those diseases. Thus, in order develop concrete expectations about
donors interests and produce testable hypotheses, it is necessary to consider a combination
of the public-ness of the benefits produced by a specific disease control activity as well as
disease characteristics that may determine the distribution of those benefits.
As the previous chapter addressed, the geographic spread of a disease may alter donors’
interests with regard to that disease. Specifically, bilateral donors, with localized popula-
tions, provide less aid for diseases that are geographically limited and pose little or no threat
to their constituents. It is also likely that the geographic spread of a disease will alter donors’
decisions regarding which disease control activities to fund. Donors have incentive to try
to gain the greatest benefit from diseases with wider geographic spread that are a greater
threat to their constituents. For example, tuberculosis is transmitted from one individual to
another with relative ease through droplet contact. It is also unlimited geographically. In
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addition, growing anti-microbial resistance has led to increased difficulty in treating some
forms of tuberculosis. Donors not only have an interest in providing more aid for tuber-
culosis than dengue fever, but donors also have an interest in providing aid for activities
that are most likely to safeguard their constituents. Because treatment, infrastructure, ad-
ministrative assistance and improved access produce primarily local benefits, donors should
provide higher levels of funding for activities within the categories of prevention, research
and surveillance. Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 13: Donors will be more likely to provide aid for surveillance for diseases
with no geographic limitations.
Hypothesis 14: Donors will be more likely to provide aid for research for diseases with
no geographic limitations.
Hypothesis 15: Donors will be more likely to provide aid for prevention for diseases
with no geographic limitations.
The previous chapter provided a theory of donor aid allocations based upon variation in
donor interest as a result of disease characteristics such as geographic spread. However, even
among bilateral donors, some geographically limited diseases received considerable quan-
tities of aid. Aid allocations for diseases such as trypanosomiasis and schistosomiasis by
bilateral donors outside the geographic range of the disease indicate some limited recogni-
tion of humanitarian need. The underlying presumption of this project is that examination
of aid allocations across diseases will reveal donors’ interests and priorities. If aid alloca-
tions for geographically limited diseases do indicate donor responsiveness to need, one would
also expect that activity level allocations would also violate the assumptions of donor inter-
ests. Bilateral donors whose populations are safely outside the geographic limits of tropical
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diseases have no incentive to allocate funds toward more public activities as the resulting
benefits are as geographically limited as the disease. Thus, one would expect that where bi-
lateral donors provide aid for geographically limited diseases, only a small proportion would
be dedicated toward activities with the most public benefits such as surveillance. Indeed,
one would expect that in the cases of limited diseases such as malaria and dengue fever,
bilateral donors would allocate more aid for activities that provided more private benefits,
such as access and treatment. Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 16: Donors will more likely to allocate aid toward treatment for geograph-
ically limited diseases than diseases with global spread.
Hypothesis 17: Donors will be more likely to allocate aid toward education for geo-
graphically limited diseases than diseases with global spread.
Hypothesis 18: Donors will be more likely to allocate aid toward improved access for
geographically limited diseases than diseases with global spread.
4.3 Data and Research Design
Within the theory and in practice, the allocation of aid is made at several levels. Donors
select to which recipient and for which disease to provide aid. In addition, donors also decide
for what activities to provide funding. The primary argument of this project is that donors
may make those decisions strategically. If this is the case, then donors will provide greater
funding for diseases that are most likely to affect their populations, as supported by the
previous chapter. In addition, donors will also provide some/more funding for some disease
control activities than others. The levels of decision in this theory are difficult to account for
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in statistical models. To test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, I use the same
population. In addition to the coding procedures described in the previous chapter, I also
coded the disease control activity supported by each grant. I then organized each activity
into eight categories — as described. I coded the disease activity as a nominal variable,
which was not used in the previous models.
However, just as in the previous chapter, these grants represent only the cases in which
aid was given. Each donor had the opportunity to provide aid to 150 recipient. For each
of the recipients, donors had the opportunity to select among 8 categories of disease control
activities for each of 25 diseases. Yet, most only provided aid in a fraction of those cases. In
order to account for cases where no aid was allocated, I generated a dataset that included
all possible donor/recipient/disease/activity combinations and input the aggregate funding
in cases where aid was given. For all other cases, the dependent variable of aid allocation
by disease control activity is coded as 0.
Because the hypotheses address both the likelihood as well as the level of funding by
strategy, the analyses for this chapter will rely upon two different dependent variables. The
first, similar to the dependent variable for the previous chapter, is a continuous measure of
aid measured in 2000 US dollars. The second is a dichotomous variable of aid in which 1
indicates that aid was received and 0 indicates that no aid was received.
I use many of the same dependent variables described in the previous chapter — specif-
ically global burden of disease, geographic limitation, and donor burden of disease. In addi-
tion to these independent variables, I also created a series of indicator variables for disease
control activity. I converted the nominal variable of disease control activity described above
into 8 indicator variables — one for each category of activity. From the resulting database
I am able to aggregate across donor, recipient, disease, and/or strategy.
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4.3.1 Research Design
The theory establishes expectations regarding the relationship between types of activities
and likelihood of receiving aid as well as the resulting level of funding. Additionally, some
of the hypotheses address the relationship between various disease characteristics and the
funding of disease control activities. As a result, I use a combination of data description,
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and logistical regression as a preliminary effort to identify
patterns in aid by activity.
Several of the hypotheses address the distribution of aid across disease control activities.
The theory suggests that strategic donors would allocate more money for some activities
than others. In order to provide a broad illustration of how aid is distributed across strate-
gies, I begin by examining the percentage of aid provided for each category of activity. I
present descriptive statistics of the distribution of aid across activity for all donors, only
bilateral donors, and only multilateral donors. The theory presented above also suggests
that one should be able to observe similarities in activity portfolios across similar diseases.
Specifically, I expect that the allocation of aid across disease control activities should be
roughly equivalent across diseases with similar geographic range. Thus, I disaggregate aid
by disease and present the distribution of aid across categories by disease — again providing
distributions across all, only bilateral and only multilateral donors.
Following this initial description of aid allocation across disease control activity, I engage
in a more thorough examination using a series of logistic and OLS regressions. The first
group of models analyzes aggregate amounts of category specific aid across activity. Using
the continuous aid variable and the eight indicator variables for disease control activities, I
examine potential patters in the volume of aid flows by activity for all donors, only bilateral
donors and only multilateral donors. The second group of models addresses the likelihood of
aid for a given disease activity based upon disease and donor level variables. I use 8 logistic
regressions — one for each strategy — in which the dependent variable is the dichotomous
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aid variable described above. Although a very simple and incomplete test of the hypotheses,
combined the combination of data description as well as logistic and OLS regression provide
a useful first step in identifying donors’ interests and priorities with regard to development
aid for health. All results are produced by STATA 11.
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 provides an initial description of aid distribution across disease control activity.
The first column after the list of disease control activity categories, reports the allocation
of aid from all donors by disease control activity. The second column reports the allocation
of aid from bilateral donors only, and the third column reports aid by multilateral donors
only. These percentages provide some initial support for distinctions between bilateral and
multilateral donors, as well as providing a few surprises.
As Table 4.2 reports, donors of all stripes provide the greatest quantity of their funding for
prevention activities. Of all aid, 53.1 percent is directed at prevention activities — making
it the activity with the highest percentage of funding. This trend holds across both bilateral
and multilateral donors. Multilateral donors allocate roughly 44% of their aid toward pre-
vention while bilateral donors distribute roughly 56% of their aid to prevention activities.
Prevention activities produce moderately public benefits, as displayed in Table 4.1. Thus,
these percentages provide tentative support for Hypotheses 12 and 15. However, the per-
centages allocated for other public activities, namely research and surveillance, produce no
such support for Hypotheses 10, 11, 13 and 14. Approximately 2.5% of all aid is distributed
for research activities and 6.1% for surveillance activities. Percentages across bilateral and
multilateral donors are quite similar — 3% and 1.1% respectively for research and 5.3% and
8.5% respectively for surveillance activities.
The percentages reported in Table 4.2 also display similarities across donors with regard
to other activities. Both types of donors allocate small percentages of aid toward infrastruc-
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ture and administrative assistance. Bilateral and multilateral donors also allocate relatively
meager percentages of their aid for educational activities — 6.9% and 2.2% respectively.
Yet, there are also some interesting points of contrast. Bilateral donors provide relatively
high percentages of aid for activities to improve access to health. At 14.8%, access activities
are ranked second in terms of percentage of aid for bilateral donors. In contrast, multilateral
donors provide on 2.9% of aid for access activities.
Likewise, although treatment is among the top three activities in terms of percentage of
funding for both types of donors, the percentage of aid allocated to treatment differs sub-
stantially between the two groups. Bilateral donors allocate 9.2% of aid toward treatment
activities — the third highest funded activity by bilateral donors. In contrast, multilat-
eral donors allocate 35.3% of aid toward treatment activities — the second highest funded
activity by multilateral donors. In terms of rank, the high priority position of treatment ac-
tivities among bilateral donors is unexpected. However, the substantial difference between
the percentage of aid allocated toward treatment between bilateral and multilateral donors
provides some limited support for the theory. Treatment activities provide primarily private
benefits — improved health to the individual receiving treatment. Because bilateral donors
serve a localized population, treatment activities produce benefits that are less likely to be
shared with donors’ constituent populations. In contrast, multilateral donors serve a wider
regional or global audience. As a result, treatment activities are more likely to provide
benefits to some set of a multilateral donors broader audience. Thus, one would expect
multilateral donors to spend a greater percentage of aid on treatment than bilateral donors
— as supported by the results here.
Although the data presented in Table 4.2 provide an initial examination of how aid is
distributed across disease control activities, it does not offer any comparison across different
diseases. Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 offer this comparison. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of
aid from all donors across activity by disease. The diseases are sorted by disease spread, with
geographically unlimited diseases appearing above the line and geographically limited disease
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below. Again, the distribution of aid by activity does not conform to the expectations of the
theory. For example, for no disease does surveillance/responsiveness received the highest
portion of aid. Indeed, a non-HIV/AIDS STDs is a relatively moderate portion of aid
used for surveillance. In contrast, both prevention and treatment consistently receive high
portions of funding across both geographically limited and unlimited diseases. Although
the high percentage of aid spent on treatment is unsurprising for geographically limited
diseases — donors can reasonably invest in treatment when the disease does not threaten
to spread to donor states — high percentages of prevention and treatment efforts for other
diseases is surprising. It appears that, with the exception of HIV/AIDS — where 37.5% of
aid is directed toward research — the activities that produce the most public benefits receive
lower portions of funding than activities that produce moderately public benefits such as
prevention and treatment.
A similar pattern holds when aid is examined by donor type. Table 4.4 presents the
distribution of aid from bilateral donors across activity by disease, while Table 4.5 presents
the distribution of aid from multilateral donors across activity, by disease. Again, the dis-
eases are sorted by disease spread, with geographically unlimited diseases appearing above
the line and geographically limited disease below. Table 4.4 indicates donors’ interest in
surveillance and responsiveness depends, in some measure, upon the disease. For example, a
relatively high percentage of aid for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, pandemic influenza, and acute
respiratory infection is directed at surveillance and responsiveness activities — 56, 27, 65,
and 21 percent respectively. Similarly, a relatively high percentage of aid for meningitis is
directed as surveillance. Yet, for many other diseases, bilateral donors allocate no aid for
surveillance including viral hepatitis and non-HIV/AIDS sexually transmitted diseases.
As expected, small portions of money are spent on infrastructure and administrative
assistance by bilateral donors. However, the data also provide some unexpected results.
The data in Table 4.4 indicate that bilateral donors allocate aid for two main activities
— prevention and treatment. Across many diseases, bilateral donors put a significant por-
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tion disease specific aid toward prevention and treatment activities. Unsurprisingly, among
vaccine preventable diseases, prevention generally receives the largest portion of aid — gen-
erally more than 80%. Likewise, the theory accurately predicted a greater portions of aid
being spent for prevention and treatment in geographically limited diseases, however, the
pattern also holds for some geographically unlimited diseases. For example, nearly 90% of
aid for cholera is directed toward prevention, while 100% of bilateral aid for viral hepatitis
is directed toward prevention. These distribution conflict with the expectations provided
by the theory. However, they may be indicators of additional necessary considerations. For
example, cholera remains virtually non-existent in developed states and poses little threat
populations within bilateral donor states. In addition, the cost of treatment for cholera is
quite low. In contrast, the primary means of preventing cholera — the establishment and
maintenance of water treatment plants and sewage systems — is quite expensive. These
prevention methods also produce long term benefits for all individuals that use it. Bilateral
donors may be choosing to invest in long-term benefits that produce benefits that are more
public.
Table 4.5 also displays a mix of expected and surprising distribution. Similar to the
distributions reported in the previous table, aid is rarely directed toward surveillance and
responsiveness. Multilateral donors only provided such aid for five diseases — HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, pandemic influenza, diarrhoeal diseases and malaria. Allocations for research
is equally sparse, calling some portions of the theory further into question.
As predicted, multilateral donors provide only limited aid for infrastructure and admin-
istrative assistance. Indeed, multilateral donors provide on aid for infrastructure within
the data used here. Also as predicted, relatively high percentages of aid from multilateral
donors for geographically limited diseases is directed at prevention and treatment activities.
Unexpectedly however, the same pattern holds for many geographically unlimited diseases.
Indeed, a high percentage of multilateral aid for HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis is directed at
treatment. Similarly, 100% of multilateral aid for acute respiratory infection and diarrhoeal
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diseases is directed at treatment.
The distribution of aid across diseases by disease control activity as presented in Ta-
bles 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 fail to support — and, indeed, call into question — Hypotheses 10 and
11. The allocation of aid for surveillance is remarkably small for many diseases, however,
with the exception of malaria and leishmaniasis, only geographically unlimited diseases re-
ceived such aid. Although some of the patterns found here are unexpected, they provide a
useful first step in the analysis. The second step is a set of three OLS regressions presented
below.
Table 4.6 presents the results of a simple OLS regression in which the dependent variable
— amount of aid allocated for each disease by strategy in 2000 US dollars — is regressed
with the eight indicator variables for categories of disease control activity. I excluded the
general/access category to act as a baseline as it is the least defined of the categories. The first
model includes aid from all donors. Within this model, prevention related activities receive
significantly more aid —more than $100,000 more than the baseline strategy of access. The
positive and significant relationship for prevention activities remains for both the bilateral
and the multilateral donor models. In addition, in the bilateral donor model, treatment
activities are also positive and significant. The coefficient indicates that treatment activities
receive roughly $7,000 more than the baseline mode of activities for improved access. These
findings provide limited support for some of the theory. I expected aid to be higher for
activities that produced the most public benefits. Clearly, the evidence here fails to support
the hypotheses with regard to surveillance and research. However, the results presented here
do offer partial support for the expectation that prevention would receive higher levels of aid
than activities that produce less public benefits. Unfortunately, the positive and significant
relationship between aid and treatment activities draws the theory further into question.
The complexity of activity level allocations, with potential variations across disease on
multiple dimensions, makes parsing out donors’ interests difficult. It is clear from the previ-
ous analyses that the distribution of aid across disease control activities is not fully explained
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by the distribution of benefits associated with each activity. However, it is also important
to consider the role of disease characteristics in the selection of activities to fund. Variation
in disease characteristics, such as its burden of disease and geographic limitations may make
it more or less likely to received aid for a specific type of disease control activity. In order
to examine the role of disease characteristics, I conduct eight logistic regressions — one for
each activity — to identify to relationship between disease characteristics and the likelihood
to received aid for a specific activity. Tables 4.7 through 4.14 display the results of those
logistic regressions. The first column presents the model using aid from all donors, while the
second and third column present the results using only aid from bilateral and multilateral
donors respectively. The standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4.7 presents the results of a logistic regression examining the role of disease char-
acteristics on receiving aid for prevention activities. As the first column indicates, global
burden of disease is a significant predictor of receiving aid for prevention activities — the
higher the global burden of a disease, the more likely donors will provide aid for prevention.
However, scanning across the next two columns, global burden of disease is only a signifi-
cant predictor of aid for bilateral donors. The first column also indicates that geographic
limitation is a significant predictor aid for prevention. The negative coefficient suggests
that geographically limited diseases are less likely to receive aid for prevention — providing
support for Hypothesis 14. However, in the next two columns geographic limitation is only
a significant predictor of less aid for multilateral donors. A disease being targeted by an
international program is also a positive and significant indicator of aid in both the model
using all donor aid, as well as the bilateral aid model. Because the purpose of “targeting” a
disease is to increase aid in order to address suffering at the individual level, it is unsurpris-
ing that donors — who appear to funnel the highest portions of money by disease toward
prevention and treatment — would be more likely to provide aid for prevention activities to
targeted diseases. It is, however, surprising that a disease being targeted is not a significant
predictor of whether a multilateral donor provides aid for prevention activities.
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Finally, the bilateral donor model also includes a variable for donor burden of disease.
The variable is intended to test assertion that bilateral donors’ interest in providing aid
for specific activities depends upon the disease in question. Specifically, I suggested in the
theory section that bilateral donors would be more likely to provide aid for surveillance,
research, and prevention among diseases with higher burden within their own borders, while
being more likely to provide aid for treatment among diseases that had low domestic burden.
The results presented in the second column of Table 4.7 suggests that this is incorrect. The
coefficient for donor burden of disease is negative and significant, indicating that diseases
with high donor burden of disease are less likely to receive aid for prevention activities.
Table 4.8 presents the results of a logistic regression examining the relationship between
disease characteristics and aid for treatment. Unlike in the previous models, global burden
of disease is a significant predictor of receiving aid for treatment activities across all donors.
As a result, higher the global burden of a disease increases the likelihood of all donors
providing aid to support treatment of that disease. In contrast, geographic limitation is
insignificant for all models, as is whether a disease is targeted by and international program.
In contrast to this, donor burden of disease, included in the bilateral donor model is positive
and significant, suggesting that bilateral donors are more likely to provide aid for treatment
in diseases that also affect their domestic populations. Again, this result contradicts the
theory. It may, however, be an indication of potential extensions in a different direction.
The theory for this project rests upon differences in donor interests as a result of the size
and location of their constituents. This result may also be a result of constituent interests.
Individual incentives for what kind of activities to engage in may change dramatically when
the individual becomes infected. For example, during flu season, a person who has not yet
been infected with influenza may be extra vigilante in hand washing and may avoid infected
individuals in an effort to prevent infection. Once the individual is infected, however, they’re
primary interest will likely shift to a focus on treatment. It is, perhaps, the same with
bilateral donors. States have an interest in preventing infections while the disease is still
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abroad. However, once domestic level infections occur and donors develop strategies for
dealing with the disease, its incentives for aid may also change. Although this is purely
speculation, it may provide an explanation for this unexpected results and also offers area
for potential future research.
Table 4.9 presents the results of a logistic regression examining the role of disease char-
acteristics on receiving aid for infrastructure. Only global burden of disease is a significant
indicator of receiving aid for infrastructure. Moreover, within the data, multilateral donors
provide no aid for infrastructure. As a result the model for multilateral donors is omitted.
Table 4.10 displays the results for models of administrative assistance activities. Just as
with the model of treatment activities, global burden of disease is positive and significant for
all three models, indicating that diseases with higher global burdens will be more likely to
received aid for administrative assistance activities. Likewise, in the model using all donors,
targeted diseases are more likely to receive aid for administrative assistance. In addition the
bilateral model indicates that donor burden of disease is a positive and significant predictor
of the allocation of administrative assistance aid by disease. Bilateral donors are more likely
to support administrative assistance activities for diseases that affect their own populations.
Again, these results are unexpected by the theory. Indeed, the relatively localized benefits
associated with administrative and policy changes and the training of personnel would lead
one to expect a relative disinterest in administrative assistance. However, this may be related
to the alternative presented with regard to treatment. Donors with experience in dealing
with a particular disease may be more willing to provide administrative assistance regarding
that disease to other countries.
Table 4.11 displays the results of the research activities models. As with several of the
other models, global burden of disease is a positive and significant predictor of aid to support
research activities for a particular disease in the full model and among bilateral donors.
However, it is not a significant predictor of multilateral donor allocations for research. Within
the multilateral donor model, a disease being targeted by and international program is a
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perfect predictor of whether a disease receives aid for research activities from a multilateral
donor. The only other variable that is a significant predictor of aid for research activities
is donor burden of disease in the bilateral model. However, contrary to the Hypothesis
13, the coefficient is negative — suggesting that bilateral donors are less likely to support
research activities for diseases with higher burden within their own population. There are
several potential explanations for this. First, it is probable that bilateral donors will be
more likely to fund their own research for diseases that affect their local constituencies.
Thus, donors are less likely to provide research funds for diseases with high donor burden of
disease. Extending this, although donors may prioritize their own research for diseases that
affect their populations, they may also be interested in eliminating the burden of research
for diseases of no interest to them. By providing aid for research on diseases that do not
or rarely affect their own populations, they successfully export research on “unimportant”
diseases to countries that should have a great interest.
Table 4.12 presents the results of a logistic regression examining the role of disease
characteristics on receiving aid for surveillance activities. The first column indicates, global
burden of disease is a significant predictor of receiving support for surveillance activities.
However, across the next two columns, global burden of disease is only a significant predictor
of aid for bilateral donors. Surprisingly, geographic limitation is not a significant predictor of
aid for surveillance — thus failing to support Hypothesis 13. The only other variable that is
a significant predictor of aid for surveillance is donor burden of disease in the bilateral donor
model. However, contrary to the expectations established by the theory, the coefficient is
negative, indicating that donors are less likely to support surveillance activities for diseases
that affect their own populations. This result is surprising and unexpected.
Table 4.13 displays the results of the logistic model for allocation of aid for education
activities. Again, the global burden of disease is a positive and significant predictor of funds
supporting educational activities for a particular disease in both the full model and the bilat-
eral donor model. However, it is not a significant predictor of the multilateral donor model.
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Geographic limitation is also a significant predictor within the bilateral donor model, how-
ever it is negative — indicating that bilateral donors are more likely to support education
activities for diseases with wider geographic spread. However, this is contrary to the expec-
tations established by the theory. Because the benefits associated with education are only
moderately public and individuals are easily excluded, it was expected that bilateral donors
would be more likely to support education activities for diseases that were geographically
limited. Thus, this finding calls Hypothesis 17 into question.
Finally, Table 4.14 displays the results of logistic regression models of aid for access
activities. Like most of the other models, global burden of disease is a positive and significant
predictor of aid for access activities in the full model. It is also a significant positive predictor
of bilateral aid for efforts to improve access as reported in the second column. It is not,
however, a significant predictor of multilateral donor aid. The only other significant predictor
of support for access activities in these three model is donor burden of disease in the bilateral
model. The negative coefficient indicates that bilateral donors are less likely to support
access activities for diseases that affect their populations, but more likely for diseases that
do not affect their populations. Hypothesis 18 suggested that, due to the relatively localized
benefits associated with improved access to medical help for specific diseases, donors would
be more likely to provide support for access only among diseases that did not affect their own
populations. These result provides initial but limited evidence in support of this Hypothesis.
In the case of bilateral donors, support for access is more likely among diseases that have
less of an impact on donors.
4.5 Analysis and Conclusion
The results presented in the previous section provide insight into the allocation of aid by
disease control activity. However, the findings stand in stark contrast to the expectations es-
tablished in the theory. Although the previous chapter provided support for donors strategic
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selection of diseases to combat, the current chapter does not produce similar results at the
activity level. The findings in this chapter suggest that, although donors choose to allocate
aid to diseases in a manner that maximizes their enjoyment of the resulting improvements to
health, donors are not equally strategic when it comes to selecting disease control activities.
Indeed, it seems that although donors — bilateral donors in particular —may choose diseases
based upon their own interests, the same donors may allocate aid by activity according to
more humanitarian concerns.
The first two hypotheses for this chapter addressed the portion of aid directed at par-
ticular activities. Specifically, these hypothesis focused upon surveillance/responsiveness
activities as well as research activities. Because these two categories produce benefits that
come nearest to being ’public’, donors were expected to provide the greatest portion of aid
to these activities. Yet, the distribution of aid for various disease control activities, as pre-
sented in the first four tables, suggests serious discontinuities between those expectations
and actual donor behaviors. Indeed, donors prioritized prevention and treatment activities
— activities with moderate or low public benefits. In addition, activities such as surveillance
and research that produce more public benefits receive relatively small portions of aid. As
displayed in Table 4.6, prevention activities receive significantly more aid than other activ-
ities in terms of total aid from all donors and multilateral donors. Moreover, although not
significant, the relationship between total aid and both surveillance and research is negative
— indicating that the volume of aid for those activities may fall below even the baseline of
aid for improving access to care. Thus, the descriptive tables and the OLS regression, clearly
lead one to reject the first two hypotheses — Hypotheses 10 and 11. Additionally, a quick
scan across the descriptive tables clear indicates that bilateral donors do provide greater
portions of aid for activities with greater public benefits. Like the summary of all data,
bilateral donors tend to give larger portions of aid to prevention and treatment activities by
disease. Indeed, the OLS model indicates that prevention and treatment activities receive
total amounts of aid that are significantly greater than the baseline category. These results
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lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 12.
Next, I assessed the role of disease characteristics on donors’ support for each disease
control activity. The next three hypotheses generated for the theory predicted that donors
were more likely to provide aid for surveillance, research, and prevention activities among
diseases with no geographic limitation. In contrast, the last three hypotheses predicted
that donors were more likely to provide aid for treatment, education and access to care
among diseases that were geographically limited. The logistic regressions for each category
of activity produced mixed results with regard to these hypotheses. The results suggest that
while donors are more or less likely to select a variety of activities, it is most likely not a
result of the public-ness of the benefits produced by that activity.
Although these results provide a usable first cut at donor selections of disease control ac-
tivities, it is limited and in need of extension. First, although the descriptive tables provide
some summary of activities across diseases, the systematic analyses fail to provide com-
parison across specific diseases. Given the theory, one would expect diseases with similar
characteristics — including global burden of disease, geographic limitations, modes of trans-
mission, etc — to have similar portfolios across activities. For example, HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis comprise similar portions of global burden, are both geographically unlimited,
and are spread easily from one individual to another. Likewise, they can share a similar
treatment problem — medicine resistance. Therefore, one would expect donors to distribute
funding across the same kinds of activities for each of these diseases. The tests provided
here fail to provide for such analyses.
In addition, these tests also fail to account for a potentially useful explanatory variable
— the cost of the various activities. For example, surveillance and reporting is a relatively
inexpensive activity in this technological age. As a result, donors may choose not to allocate
as much aid for such activities. In comparison, prevention and treatment for some diseases
may be quite costly. It is also possible that donors’ interests in surveillance and monitoring
is so compelling as to encourage them to produce the good themselves. For example, the
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Center for Disease Control in the United States engages in extensive disease monitoring
activities.
Finally, these results may also indicate a shortcoming of the theory. Although the results
of the previous chapter clearly suggest that donors do behave strategically in their alloca-
tion of disease specific aid, the results to do not require the same behavior at subsequent
levels of decisions regarding that aid. Indeed, the result presented here suggest that, when
distributing money across activities, donors are, perhaps, more humanitarian.
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Table 4.1: The publicness of disease control activities
Category Activities Public-ness
Prevention Immunization, Preventive Measures, etc. Moderate
Treatment Anti-retroviral Therapy, Antibiotics, etc. Low
Infrastructure Clinics, Hospitals, etc. Low
Administrative Assistance Advisors, Personnel, etc. Moderate
Research Data Collection, Clinical Trial, etc. Moderate
Surveillance Monitoring, Reporting, etc. High
Education Dissemination of information, Behavior modification Moderate
General/Access Health system support, etc. Moderate
Table 4.2: Percentage of Aid by Strategy
Strategy % Total Aid % Bilateral Aid % Multilateral Aid
Prevention 53.1 56.2 44.2
Infrastructure 0.07 0.1 0
Administrative 4.6 4.3 5.4
Treatment 16.0 9.2 35.3
Research 2.5 3 1.1
Surveillance/Monitoring 6.1 5.3 8.5
Education 5.7 6.9 2.2
General 11.7 14.8 2.9
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression of Strategy Aid
Variable All Donors Bilateral Donors Multilateral Donors
Prevention 143532.5.7* (10226.7) 78068* (7903.06) 269404* (25737)
Treatment 4414.3 (10099.7) 7180.9* (823.1)) 26708.9 (23410.3)
Infrastructure -7901 (1045.2)) -10463 (7804.9) -2974.9 (25418.3)
Administrative Assistance -1027.5 (1309.1) -6552 (7512.3) 9694.6 (22461)
Research -6311.2 (8571.2) -4183.2 (6027.1) -2237.8 (22582.1)
Surveillance -7299.3 (8746.7) -10205 (6759.3) -1711.1 (22012.9)
Education -8038.8 (10277) -1672.6 (7804.9) -2974.9 (25443)
N 200 200 200
∗ = p-value less than .05
Table 4.7: Logistic Regression of Aid for Prevention Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.008* (0.002) 0.026* (0.004) 0.001 (0.006)
Geographic Limitation -0.581* (0.212) -0.409 (0.251) -1.38* (0.56)
Targeted Disease 0.822* (0.212) 0.781* (0.253) 0.793 (0.471)
Donor Burden of Disease -0.379* (0.121)
N 1595 975 520
∗ = p-value less than .05
Table 4.8: Logistic Regression of Aid for Treatment Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.022* (0.003) 0.031* (0.005) 0.034* (0.009)
Geographic Limitation 0.342 (0.268) 0.259 (0.321) 1.38 (0.77)
Targeted Disease 0.246 (0.3) 0.209 (0.354) -0.293 (0.836)
Donor Burden of Disease 0.127* (0.046)
N 1595 975 520
∗ = p-value less than .05
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Table 4.9: Logistic Regression of Aid for Infrastructure Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.021* (0.008) 0.038* (0.011)
Geographic Limitation -1.16 (1.11) -1.04 (1.151)
Targeted Disease - 0.014 (1.106) 0.004 (1.136)
Donor Burden of Disease -0.258 (0.163)
N 1595 975
∗ = p-value less than .05
Table 4.10: Logistic Regression of Aid for Administrative Assistance Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.021* (0.004) 0.032* (0.006) 0.023* (0.116)
Geographic Limitation -0.223 (0.363) -0.182 (0.407) -0.628 (1.198)
Targeted Disease 0.797* (0.363) 0.729 (0.408) 0.516 (1.183)
Donor Burden of Disease 0.187* (0.074)
N 1595 975 520
∗ = p-value less than .05
Table 4.11: Logistic Regression of Aid for Research Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.25* (0.006) 0.042* (0.008) 0.031 (0.02)
Geographic Limitation 0.885 (0.482) 0.889 (0.55) 2.794
Targeted Disease 0.044 (0.526) 0.058 (0.563)
Donor Burden of Disease -0.261* (0.114)
N 1595 975 440
∗ = p-value less than .05
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Table 4.12: Logistic Regression of Aid for Surveillance/Responsiveness Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.014* (0.004) 0.032* (0.006) 0.002 (0.01)
Geographic Limitation -0.497 (0.371) -0.462 (0.478) -0.237 (0.638)
Targeted Disease 0.201 (0.405) 0.344 (0.492) -0.025 (0.785)
Donor Burden of Disease -0.226* (0.092)
N 1595 975 520
∗ = p-value less than .05
Table 4.13: Logistic Regression of Aid for Education Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.009* (0.005) 0.023* (0.007) 0.026 (0.02)
Geographic Limitation -1.19 (0.559) -1.31* (0.645)
Targeted Disease -0.351 (0.623) -0.162 (0.641)
Donor Burden of Disease -0.285 (0.158)
N 1595 975 300
∗ = p-value less than .05
Table 4.14: Logistic Regression of Aid for Access Activities
Variable All donors Bilateral Multilateral
Global Burden of Disease 0.017* (0.004) 0.033* (0.056) 0.025 (0.02)
Geographic Limitation -0.268 (0.343) -0.307 (0.38) 1.058 (1.653)
Targeted Disease 0.344 (0.371) 0.443 (0.392)
Donor Burden of Disease -0.284* (0.101)
N 1595 975 440
∗ = p-value less than .05
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Disease has historically played an important role in shaping societies and politics. Infec-
tious disease accounts for the largest portion of human morbidity and mortality throughout
history, affecting lives, economies, and civilizations. Human responses to infectious disease
establish patterns of behavior that persist beyond a single infection, and often extend beyond
a single community. For example, the removal of lepers from society, a practice described
in Leviticus (13:44-46), persisted for thousands of years. Indeed, the United States’ Public
Health Service Act of 1944 granted the Surgeon General powers of apprehension and de-
tention for those aﬄicted with leprosy, and was only formally abolished in 1985 (National
Hansen’s Disease Programs 2011). Similar strategies have been applied to diseases from
plague to HIV/AIDS. Moreover, scholars attribute changes in political and religious institu-
tions in medieval Europe to pandemic plague (McNeill 1976, Mack 1992, Hays 1998, Smith-
Price 2002), and the design of colonial institutions in part to the threat of disease to im-
migrants from colonial powers (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001). Governments have
endeavored to protect their populations from disease, used disease as a weapon against en-
emies, and collaborated and cooperated with other governments to improve the health of
people everywhere. Development aid for health represents one of the most extensive of these
efforts to control the spread of disease. Yet, much of the international relations and foreign
aid literatures fails to address the politics of health and health aid.
Development aid for health (DAH) provides financial and material support for health
systems in developing states. In many low income developing countries, external resources
makes up a considerable portion of countries health budget — as much as 45% as in Er-
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itrea (World Health Organization 2009). Yet, despite increases in DAH over the last thirty
years, there remains a serious gap between the need and available resources for health care
in developing countries. Across developing countries, where need is the highest and devel-
opment aid makes up a significant portion of a countries health resources, the allocation of
development aid for health determines not only the quantity of resources available, but also
which resources and for whom. As a result, the allocation DAH can have a powerful impact
on the distribution of health across developing countries. Decisions regarding the allocation
of DAH are largely divorced from individuals in developing states — those most in need. If
those decision are made based upon criteria other than need, the misapporpriation of DAH
may lead to increased disease, disability, and death.
This dissertation begins with the assertion that development aid for health is subject
to many of the same political influences as other types of aid. The foreign aid literature
contains a tremendous volume of studies examining the determinants and effectiveness of
various types of foreign aid including economic development, military, and democratization.
Although DAH has been included as a component of economic development aid, few studies
have addressed the allocation of health aid specifically. Indeed, much of the literature views
development aid for health as a technical and apolitical issue. If this view is correct, one
would expect disease specific DAH to be carefully targeted to diseases that cause the greatest
suffering or have the most cost effective solutions. Yet, the few studies that do examine
health aid flows suggest that aid allocations do not match disease burden. I argue that these
discontinuities are a result of strategic behavior on the part of donors.
Theories of foreign aid allocations suggest that donors allocate aid based upon a combi-
nation of recipient need and donors’ interests. I extend these theories to development aid
for health. I address infectious disease control as a impure-public good — the publicness of
which is determined by the geographic spread of the particular disease. Improved control of
diseases with global spread, such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, produces benefits that can
be enjoyed worldwide. In contrast, improved control of diseases such as schistosomiasis and
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dengue fever produces benefits that are only enjoyed by individuals and countries within
the geographic range of the disease or its intermediary host. If DAH is allocated based
on donors’ interests, there should be observable differences in the allocation of aid between
geographically limited and unlimited diseases.
In addition, variations across other disease characteristics provide useful tools for ex-
amining other aspects of donors’ interests and also global and recipient need. For example,
burden of disease, which varies by disease and across countries, is used to determine the level
of threat posed by a disease to populations in donor states as well as to determine recipient
need. Using disease burden, geographic spread, cost, and the availability of vaccinations for
disease control, I examine the allocation of DAH in order to identify the political influences
that drive these allocations.
I first assess the relationship between levels of aid and donors’ interests by disease. In
doing so, I address whether development aid for health is allocated in a manner that is
consistent with an apolitical nature as assumed in previous literature. In addition, I also
examine what disease characteristics result in higher levels of funding and assess differences
across types of donors. In doing so, I am able to address differences in donors’ priorities
across diseases.
Second, I address differences in disease control activities. Just as with disease, different
disease control activities produce a variety of benefits that fall along a continuum of pub-
licness. For example, surveillance and monitoring produce information that can be used by
all countries. In contrast, treatment produces benefits that are enjoyed primarily by the
individual receiving treatment. Assuming that donors are interested in producing the most
public benefits, one would expect donors to invest in disease control activities that produce
the most public benefits. Thus, for the second portion of this project, I assess the relation-
ship between donors interests and DAH allocations by disease control activities. Specifically,
I address whether donors are more likely to allocated aid for disease control activities that
produce public benefits for diseases in which improvements to disease control is most publicly
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shared. The results of these tests are summarized in the following section. I then discuss the
theoretical and policy implications of these finding before discussing future research related
to this project.
5.1 Summary of Findings
The two empirical chapters provide mixed results regarding the political nature of DAH
allocations. The findings, summarized below, suggest that while donors’ selection of disease
matches the theory described above, allocation of aid by disease control activity does not
follow the same clear pattern.
5.1.1 Selection of Diseases
The statistical analyses in chapter 3 address the relationship between disease characteristics
and level of aid. The findings from chapter 3 are summarized in Table 5.1 The analysis
begins with the reporting of findings from interviews with representatives from donor orga-
nizations and agencies. Although the results of these interviews suggest that the trend of
treating DAH as apolitical is correct, a comparison of disease burdens and DAH levels across
diseases indicates that aid flows do not match need or policy-makers’ rhetoric. Instead, the
results suggest that donors allocate development aid for health across diseases with partic-
ular attention to specific diseases. For example, HIV/AIDS has become a focal point for
DAH allocations.
In addition, the results demonstrate that different types of donors allocate DAH ac-
cording to different interests. Using disease characteristics, it is possible to identify donors’
priorities with regard to disease specific development aid for health. Bilateral donors, which
have localized populations with higher levels of accountability, allocate more aid for diseases
with wider geographic spread and that account for a higher burden of disease within their
own borders. In contrast, multilateral donors allocate more aid for diseases that account
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for higher burden of disease within the recipient states. In addition, bilateral donors also
prioritize diseases based upon the cost of treatment. Diseases that are easily controlled in
developed countries through immunization programs receive less funding. However, diseases
that have a higher average cost per DALY averted receive greater bilateral aid. This suggests
that bilateral donors hold diseases that are effectively controlled at home as low priorities
for foreign aid, yet diseases that are expensive to prevent and treat are of higher priority.
In contrast, there is no relationship between multilateral donors and the cost or geographic
spread of disease. These findings support the overlying argument of this project — develop-
ment aid for health is subject to the same political influences as other forms of foreign aid.
Just as with other types of aid, DAH is allocated based upon a mix of both recipient need
and donors’ interests.
5.1.2 Selection of Disease Control Activities
The statistical analyses in chapter 4 address the relationship between donors interests and
the allocation of aid for disease control activities. The findings for chapter 4 are summarized
in Table 5.2. The analysis begins with summary tables presenting the percentage of aid
allocated by disease control strategy and also broken down by disease. These summary
tables present a basic picture of how aid is distributed across activities. The results indicate
that, across most diseases, donors prioritize prevention and treatment activities — even at
the expense of activities that produce more public benefits, such as surveillance and research.
These summary tables are followed with three OLS regressions examining the relationship
between disease control activity and aid levels. The result indicate that greater levels of
aid are provided for prevention activities — as suggested by the summary tables — and, in
the case of bilateral donors, treatment activities. These findings stand in stark contrast to
the expectations established by the theory. In particular, bilateral donors’ prioritization of
treatment — activities that produce primarily private benefits — indicates that the interests
that drive aid allocation by disease may not be driving allocations by activity.
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These models are followed with logistic regressions examining the likelihood of a aid
being allocated for a particular strategy based upon disease characteristics. Although the
theory predicts that diseases with great geographic spread and donor burden of disease will be
more likely to receive aid for surveillance and research activities, this is not the case. Indeed,
diseases with lower donor burden of disease are more likely to receive aid for both of these
activities from bilateral donors. Bilateral donors are more likely to provide aid for prevention
when donor burden of disease is low. In contrast, bilateral donors are more likely to provide
aid for treatment when donor burden of disease is high. In comparison, multilateral donors
are more likely to give aid for prevention of geographically limited diseases and for treatment
of diseases that account for greater portions of global burden of disease.
The findings in chapter 4 fail to support the theory and, in fact, contradict the predicted
outcomes. These results suggest that while donors may select diseases for development aid
strategically in order to maximize their enjoyment of benefits, when it comes to the selection
of disease control activities, donors behave in a more humanitarian manner.
5.2 Theoretical Implications
The analyses in this dissertation provide several theoretical insights. First, the analysis of
development aid for health by disease demonstrates that the allocation of DAH should not
be viewed as apolitical or technical decisions. Just as with other types of foreign aid, devel-
opment aid for health is subject to political influences. Although it appears that recipient
need is a factor for some donors, donor interests is also a powerful predictor of disease specific
allocations. In addition, expectations regarding the aid behaviors across types of donors —
bilateral versus multilateral — appear to hold in the context of allocations of DAH.
In addition, the lack of congruence between the findings in chapters 3 and 4 suggest
that aid decisions are made at several levels which are, potentially, subject to different
decision-making criteria or interests. The foreign aid literature has long considered foreign
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aid decisions to be a two stage process — the first stage involves “gatekeeping,” or the
selection of recipient countries, and the second stage involves deciding up the level of aid
(Cingranelli & Pasquarello 1985). However, the results here suggest that, in attempting
to parse out donors’ priorities, one must also consider how and why aid is allocated across
activities.
Finally, these findings provide theoretical implications for the cooperation literature. The
results of these analyses indicate that the incentive structures of individual actors will affect
outcomes, even in situations where agreement is high. Unlike other areas of cooperation,
health and disease provide issues with high levels of agreement. All actors agree upon the
nature of the problems faced. Information regarding prevention, treatment, and control of
disease is widely available and the effects are directly observable. Yet, despite this high level
of agreement, donors’ responses to differing incentive structures — in particular, domestic
interests — can result in misallocation of disease specific aid and the undersupply of a public
good.
5.3 Policy Implications
Several policy implications develop as a result of these findings. Primarily, the results of
chapter three suggest that disease specific development aid for health is subject to political
influence. The result of these influences is the misallocation of aid across diseases. All actors
agree upon the ethical and normative outcomes expected from development aid for health.
The distribution of development aid for health affects the control of disease worldwide,
especially in the developing world. Yet, were donors respond to a constellation influences
other than need, the results are a suboptimal allocation of aid — leaving some diseases with
far fewer resources than necessary.
This misallocation is increased when one considers the similarities across donors. The
largest portion of development aid for health if provided by bilateral donors. These donors are
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overwhelmingly developed democracies that generally lie outside the geographic limitations
of many diseases. Thus, if donors’ aid allocations are the result of interests — interests that
are shared across donors — the misallocation of DAH is multiplied. Such distortions will not
only determine which diseases received aid, but will have a profound impact on morbidity
and mortality in developing countries.
In addition to these normative concerns, the allocation of DAH based upon donors’
interests also has consequences for recipient states. Recipients, desperate for increased health
resources, will have incentive to focus on programs directed at diseases that are more likely to
threaten populations in developed states, regardless of their own domestic need. This in turn
may create further distortion — rewarding states for ignoring their own health priorities.
In contrast, recipients may attempt to use such incentives to transfer funds from disease
programs of interest to bilateral donors in order to better fund domestic health concerns. For
example, if a recipient is aware of bilateral donors’ inclination to fund HIV/AIDS programs, it
may choose to invest greater health resources in programs for geographically limited diseases
such as malaria and dengue fever, expecting donors to fill the gap in funding for HIV/AIDS.
Finally, differences across bilateral and multilateral donors suggest that multilateral
donors are better able to address humanitarian concerns. As a result, efforts to devise effec-
tive partnerships among donors should include a mix of bilateral and multilateral donors or
an effective division of labor. If bilateral donors responsiveness to domestic influences cre-
ates shortcomings across some diseases, multilateral donors may rightly be the appropriate
alternative. The unfortunately flaw in this argument is the relative difference in total fund.
Bilateral donors remain the primary source of development aid for health. Thus, even with
a division of labor among donors in which multilateral donors took on primary responsibility
for geographically limited diseases, funding shortfalls and gaps would still occur.
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5.4 Future Research
The literature on development aid for health has thus far been driven primarily by policy
scholars. Although these efforts have produced several important studies, there is much
work to be done and ample room for contributions from the political science literature. This
dissertation raises several research questions and directions for additional research. First,
the inconclusive findings of chapter 4 clearly indicate that additional research is needed in
order to parse out how and why donors select disease control activities. Unlike the findings
in chapter 3, donors do not appear to fund activities based upon the benefits they might
receive. This may be explained in several ways. It may be the result of an additional level
of decision-making. It may also be the result of differences in domestic interests. Further
research is needed to parse out these questions.
In addition, the foreign policy literature provides several illustrations of future directions
for studies of health aid. First, like other areas of foreign aid, health aid is subject to the same
questions of effectiveness. Does health aid result in decreases in morbidity and mortality?
By examining disease specific aid allocations at the country level as well as disease specific
morbidity and mortality rates, it is not only possible to determine the effectiveness of DAH,
but also determine if misallocations as described in the previous section result in changes
in morbidity and mortality across diseases. Also, this project does not address recipient
selection. The data for this project would lend themselves well to a model examining recipient
selection for DAH.
The identification of a particular disease on which to focus large quantities of development
aid is, as of yet, and understudied and undetermined process. One explanation for this
process might include the role of domestic audiences. In the United States, HIV/AIDS
awareness increases pressure for policy-makers to take action with regard toward that disease,
whereas the relative lack of information regarding acute respiratory infections may prevent
action. Likewise, this process might be the result of donor band-wagoning, in which the
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identification of a problem and provision of funding by one donor encourages other donors
to act in a similar manner. Such activities would undoubtedly lead to aid misallocation. As
of yet, these processes are unexamined, but deserve further attention.
Finally, there remains ample room for further testing and theorizing. The theory pre-
sented in this dissertation could also be extended to other health comparisons. In particular,
examining the differences between DAH allocations for infectious versus non-communicable
diseases may shed further light on donors priorities. Because non-communicable disease are
not subject to person-to-person transmission and spread, one would expect DAH for these
disease to differ considerably from infectious disease. In addition, one of the first projects
following the dissertation will be to complete data collection and testing while including
development aid for health allocations from philanthropic foundations. Moreover, the find-
ings of chapter 3 and 4 suggest that there are additional processes involved in the allocation
of DAH that are not accounted for by the theory. For example, the importance role of a
disease being targeted by an international program suggests that some level of collaboration
is occurring and may have an effect upon aid allocations and outcomes.
In sum, although this dissertation serves as a first step into investigations of development
aid for health, there remains much work to be done. This dissertation has highlighted the
influence of political considerations in the allocation of DAH. However, there remains a sub-
stantial gap in the foreign aid literature. In order to understand allocations of development
aid for health and its affect on health in developing countries, further research is necessary.
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